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Executive Summary 
 
Aging has complex effects on global capital markets. If elderly people save less than younger 
people, an aging society saves less. This should increase interest rates since supply of funds 
gets tight. At the same time, the younger generation becomes ever smaller, so there is also less 
demand for new investment. The equilibrium effect is thus uncertain. 
Pessimists believe in the so-called “asset meltdown” hypothesis: households demand for 
financial assets will plummet between 2030 and 2040, when the baby boomers retire and die, 
asset values will melt down dramatically and the return on financial investments will fall 
sharply. 
Optimists stress economic mechanisms which soften or even reverse the negative impacts of 
aging on capital markets. One such important counter-mechanism is an aging society’s need 
for more capital since capital must increasingly replace labor and, as described, supply of 
funds will be scarce. This rising demand for real capital increases the return to capital at 
exactly the same time as pessimists fear the prospect of an asset meltdown. 
This study will look at the general equilibrium outcome according to several quantitative 
studies from France, Germany and the US, plus corroborating evidence on saving behavior 
and investment demand. 
Its main qualitative results are: 
(1) The shifts on capital markets due to demographics are neither a sudden nor an unexpected 
event. The baby-boomers will retire over a period of about 15 years. As the demographics 
are largely known (relatively speaking, at least, when compared to the possible 
profitability of a company in the future), the capital market will also anticipate this 
development. Consequently, the decline in returns discussed above is spread over 
approximately 20 years and is barely noticeable each year. 
(2) In 2030 funded old-age provision will not yet have achieved a balanced situation (what is 
termed "maturity status"). Many employees will continue to establish new funded old-age 
provision until approx. 2050. This will significantly cushion the effect of a withdrawal of 
capital by the baby-boomers. 
(3) It is also due to the two previous points that demographic factors will not cause too much 
of a fall in average returns but that also the holdings and returns for individual investments 
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(shares, fixed-interest bonds and safe investments where there are no interest and price 
factors) will only see minimal and very gradual shifts. 
(4) The reduction of around 8 million (approx. one third) in the active working population by 
the year 2040 will accelerate the capital intensification process. Capital (machines, 
computers, etc.) must be deployed to make up for the shrinking number of people working 
in the German economy because neither imports nor a sudden boost in productivity are 
likely to compensate to this extent. This will mean that the demand for real capital will 
rise at that point in time when labor will become particularly short, i.e. precisely at the 
time when the baby-boomers retire and it is said that the "asset meltdown" will take place. 
(5) In a global world returns on capital will not be dominated by individual countries. 
International diversification is of particular to help to those countries that are aging greatly 
(Germany, Italy and Japan), enabling them to minimize demographic risk in respect of 
capital returns. Although the majority of industrial countries are aging, France, Great 
Britain and the USA do not share our problem of a rapidly shrinking working population. 
This study goes an important step further and quantifies the potential effects of aging on asset 
prices using a sophisticated overlapping generations (OLG) model with international 
diversification reflecting the global nature of capital markets. The results from this MEA-
OLGA model can be summarized as follows: Purely because of demographic factors, overall 
capital market returns on productive capital in the core aging European region will fall by 
around one percentage point by 2035, assuming optimal diversification in the EU area. If one 
takes the average over the last 25 years as a basis for calculating the relevant long-term 
returns on all types of investment in productive capital (equities, industrial bonds and direct 
placements invested by the corporate sector in plant and equipment), returns will fall from the 
current figure of 7.7% to 6.7% in the fourth decade of this century. If no international 
diversification takes place, this drop will be approximately 20 base points higher, whereas 
broader diversification across the whole of the OECD rather than just within the EU will 
reduce the decline caused by demographics by around 20 base points. 
The decline in returns on capital purely as a result of demographic factors is naturally 
intensified when investments for funded pension provision resulting from the pensions reform 
rise, as the increase in capital available puts pressure on returns. If all the savings for funded 
pension provision are invested domestically, this effect will account for an additional decline 
in the return to productive capital by approximately 40 base points. However, this decline can 
be almost completely avoided through international diversification. 
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The long-term trends have less effect on equities than they do on fixed-interest securities. This 
reflects the fact that older households are less likely to take risks. The increased demand from 
this group for fixed-interest securities and safe investments puts additional pressure on the 
returns of such investments. Consequently, the equity premium, i.e. the difference in yields 
between equities and secure investments, will gradually increase over the next 25 years. 
However, this effect is temporary: it will fall again to the extent that the baby-boom 
generation will use the assets securely invested for old-age provision for consumption 
purposes. 
Quantifying this effect is difficult. The MEA-PORTA model provides approximate orders of 
magnitude. The current yield to maturity of fixed-interest securities is likely to fall in real 
terms from 4.1% to around 2.8% over the next 25 years and the yields on secure investments, 
i.e. investments with no risk relating to price or interest, will decline from 3.3% to 1.8%. Over 
the same period, the equity premium will rise by around 70 base points. 
The results so far relate to collateral in productive capital. The sector that will be affected 
most by the demographic trend will be returns on real estate, however, only in the very long 
term. The pessimism of Mankiw and Weil (1989) who made the asset meltdown hypothesis 
popular in the USA, appears to be misguided. This study provides evidence from Germany 
which is suggestive for France (probably more dampened) and Italy (probably somewhat 
stronger) as well. The main insight is that household size lags population size by about 20 
years. One reason is that an older society features a smaller household size and thus, ceteris 
paribus, more households. Hence, housing demand will only begin to fall from 2025 onwards 
even if populations start declining today. Thereafter housing demand will only drop very 
gradually such that house prices will not fall dramatically over the next 30 years. Mankiw and 
Weil’s (1989) estimate of a housing price drop between 1990 and 2010 to half of their 
original levels will certainly not materialize. 
Taken all evidence together, capital markets are not immune to demography. Rates of return 
will decline in response to demographic forces, but only very moderately. There is no 
scientific reason to assume that a major “asset meltdown” will occur when the babyboom 
generation retires. 
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1. Introduction 
The aging of populations is one of the most important big trends of the 21st centuries. It will 
affect not only our social security systems but also the working of our good, labor and capital 
markets. This study investigates the effects of aging on asset prices. Point of departure is the 
hypothesis of an "asset meltdown". This hypothesis, which is avidly discussed by academics 
and bankers alike, contends that in the fourth decade of this century the demand of households 
for financial investments will plummet, the value of assets will be in meltdown and 
consequently the return on capital will fall sharply.  
If this hypothesis holds true, implications for the economy and social policy were immense 
already today. For instance, it destroys the rationale for using private saving to complement 
and partially substitute for the ailing pay-as-you-go social insurance systems. This is because, 
when asset values and returns on capital decline dramatically in the 2030s, the funds that 
savers have struggled to amass to support themselves in old age will then fall in value just at 
the time when they are needed the most. 
The "asset meltdown" hypothesis may sound convincing – but only at first glance. Starting 
point of the "asset meltdown" hypothesis is the retirement of the baby-boomers. The large 
demographic group of the baby-boomers will start to retire around 2020/30 and will try to sell 
at least some of their assets to the younger generation, a much smaller group, in order to use 
the proceeds to finance part of their expenditure in old age. The argument is that, because 
there are a large number of sellers but only a few purchasers, the price of shares, securities 
and real estate will hit rock bottom. Those selling real estate will find things particularly 
tough: after 2040, the population in the core countries of continental Europe will gradually 
slump and - so it is argued - fewer apartments and owner-occupied homes will be required, 
with the result that many will not be sold or the prices they sell for will be disappointing. 
This debate originally started in an environment where the complete opposite applied - the 
boom in the American residential property market of the 1970s and 1980s.  The argument that 
more baby-boomers were piling into the property market and this group had greater 
purchasing power than their parents' generation was revived as one possible explanation for 
the boom in equities of the 1990s. This same generation, which 15 years previously was 
behind the rise in residential property prices, was now responsible for the boom in the equity 
markets within the context of provision for old age. 
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Now the atmosphere has reversed completely. Finally, when the bubble in the equity markets 
burst in 2000 followed by the years of the sustained bear market, parallels started to be drawn 
with the long period of stagnation in the Japanese stock market, which by then had lasted for 
over ten years. The doom merchants proclaimed that there would be no attractive returns from 
equity markets in the foreseeable future. Japan looks like an irrefutable example of the fatal 
influence of demography on capital markets because it is the country in the world that is aging 
the most rapidly and, at the same time, it is the OECD country with the most serious crisis in 
capital markets. 
While this all may sound very plausible, the real world is more complicated and it is in no 
way clear whether we really need to be so fearful of the spectre of "asset meltdown". First of 
all, the reasons for both the drop in Japanese share prices and the more recent falls in 
European and American stock markets are not due to demographic changes. This is because 
shifts in the age structure of the population are slow and long-term changes and, as far as their 
impact on capital markets is concerned, these are currently overshadowed by much more 
powerful and short-term influences such as the banking crisis in Japan and the loss of trust 
resulting from the ENRON scandal. 
Secondly, the current behavioral patterns do not support the argument that older people are 
divesting themselves of assets so dramatically that it will result in the worldwide drop in 
returns that everybody fears. Whereas numerous studies have shown that less is saved in old 
age, the older generations in almost all European countries and in Japan are not drawing on 
their savings. Although the wealth of older people is not rising as quickly as that of younger 
people, on average there is no significant reduction in asset values at the present time. The 
"asset meltdown" hypothesis therefore assumes that a radical change will occur in the way 
people behave to a degree that has not been observed to date. Consequently, the "asset 
meltdown" hypothesis is highly speculative. 
Thirdly - and at least as important - there is a powerful trend in the other direction. An aging 
society needs more rather than less capital as it will increasingly need to substitute labor with 
capital. This boost in demand for productive capital (i.e. machines, computers, etc.) increases 
returns on capital, particularly in the phase critical for "asset meltdown" around 2030. It is a 
basic point of fundamental macroeconomic importance for private provision in old age 
(security in old age, health care, long-term care risk): productive capital is needed in an aging 
society, in particular, both to replace younger workers who are becoming more scarce and to 
make the (relatively fewer) members of the available labor force more productive. 
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After all, the aging process is by no means identical across the world. This will bring about 
shifts in international capital flows as capital basically tends to flow from countries where the 
population is aging more quickly to those with a relatively young population in which capital 
returns are higher. The global capital returns will not fall anything like as dramatically as 
might be suggested by a misleading study that examined demographic developments in 
isolation for rapidly aging countries (Germany, Italy and Japan). For these countries the 
interdependence of global capital markets is particularly helpful. 
The impact of an aging population on capital markets is thus rather complex and can only be 
explained in terms of the equilibrium of forces and not by individual mechanisms. This 
complex interaction is the subject of the present study.  
This study has the following structure: in section 2 we start with the reasons for the feared 
long-term changes in capital markets and present the central parameters of demographic 
change in an international context. This is followed in section 3 by a critical overview of 
existing studies on "asset meltdown" and the conclusions they draw. Here the analysis of 
which assumptions or procedures drive the respective results is particularly significant. 
Section 4 focuses on the macroeconomic development. We analyse how the demographic 
change will affect the overall economic returns on productive capital and saving. Section 5 
differentiates this analysis using a dynamic portfolio model according to equities, fixed-
interest securities and investments with no interest or price risk. Section 6 deals with the 
developments that can be expected on the property market. Finally, in section 7, we 
summarize our results with a view to assessing their significance for economic and social 
policy. 
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2. Demographic Changes in the OECD Countries 
What will happen in the next 30 years? Initially, the significance of an aging population for 
Europe will be a change in the population structure because the decline in population over the 
next 30 years is not really significant. This holds even more strongly for the OECD countries. 
Europe's population will not see a sharp drop until after 2040, when the baby-boom 
generation starts to die. In contrast, there will be a massive drop in the number of people of 
working age for all OECD countries. 
2.1   The demographic support ratio 
This relative shift will be illustrated most clearly by the most important macroeconomic 
indicator of aging and that is the number of persons of working age in relation to the number 
of consumers, whose demand for goods and services has to be satisfied by those of working 
age. This indicator, the demographic "support ratio", is plotted in Figure 1, showing the five 
most important regions of the world from our economic perspective: apart from Germany, the 
other 14 EU member states, USA, Japan, and then the remaining 13 OECD states. 
Figure 1: Demographic support ratio 
(proportion of persons in the total population of working age) 
 
Source: Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003), based on the UN's demographic projections (2000). 
"Working age" covers all persons between the ages of 15 and 65. 
 
All regions in the world are aging, as can be seen from the decreasing proportion of persons 
of working age in the total population. However, it is possible to identify clear differences in 
both the extent and the time sequence with which the population is aging. Figure 1 shows the 
particularly instructive example of Germany and Japan. Until 2015, Japan will age at a 
considerably faster rate than Germany but then Germany will catch up. Germany's 
demographic crisis will reach its peak at around 2035; after this Japan will see another wave 
when the age will shoot up again and the potential labor force in the other EU countries will 
also dwindle compared to Germany. 
2.2   Participation in the labor force and the economic support ratio 
It must be said that this view of demographics does not take actual participation in the labor 
force into account. This is the only figure that determines the actual number of those 
economically active in the economy and who produce the consumer and capital goods as well 
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as services for the whole population. Participation in the labor force varies greatly 
internationally: see Figure 2 for comparison, which is based on the OECD's data on the active 
population (2002). As an analogy to Figure 1, this proportion of economically active persons 
in the overall population is the "economic support ratio" of an economy. This is the 
demographic basis for all our calculations below. Here we assume that the proportion of 
women employed will adjust to 50% in 2050, the retirement age will increase by two years 
and the unemployment for specific countries will reduce to a level that equates to the natural 
unemployment rate. Details can be found in Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003). 
Figure 2: Economic support ratio  
(Proportion of economically active persons in the total population) 
 
Source: Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003), based on the UN's demographic projections (2000) 
and the OECD's age and gender-specific employment rates (2002). 
A comparison of Figures 1 and 2 provides an impressive demonstration of the important 
influence that gainful employment has on the basic forecast.  As we know, the participation in 
the labor force is much higher in the USA and Japan, particularly in the 55 to 64 age range, 
which is particularly critical for demographic change. As a result of this, the overall economic 
support ratio of the USA and Japan is only falling slightly and at a very slow rate. In contrast, 
when it comes to participation in the labor force, Germany is only in the middle of the field. 
On top of this, Germany will see a steeper fall between 2015 and 2035 when, although the 
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baby-boomers will retire later than they do today, it will still be relatively early in 
international comparison. In spite of this, participation in the labor force in Germany is still 
clearly above the average in the other EU member states. This is because participation in the 
labor force is very low in countries such as France, Italy and Spain. However, the trend in 
other OECD countries is very different: here the employment rates will increase until 2025 
and then they will only fall very slowly. Turkey will have an important effect on this 
development. Between 2020 and 2025 the size of this country's population will have 
overtaken that of Germany and it will have a high employment rate as a result of the younger 
age structure. 
2.3   The age burden and the old-age dependency ratio 
The "economic age burden ratio" or the "old-age dependency ratio", i.e. the number of 
pensioners per employed person, is based on the employment rate. This statistical parameter 
shown in Figure 3 is particularly familiar as a burden on social insurance systems. If we 
assume that each employed person produces the aggregate of his or her own consumption and 
capital goods, the statistical parameter also indicates how many additional persons production 
by employed persons has to cover. 
Figure 3: Economic age burden ratio or old-age dependency ratio 
(Number of pensioners divided by the number of employed persons) 
 
Source: Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003), based on the UN's demographic projections (2000) 
and the OECD's age and gender-specific employment rates (2002). 
 
 
International demographic trends can therefore be summarized into three core points: 
• Demographic development is in no way uniform within the OECD or even within the 
EU. 
• In addition to this, employment rates vary greatly between different countries so that the 
long-term development of both factors - demography and employment - must be taken 
into account in the study. 
• Thanks to its high employment rate, Japan - a country with a rapidly aging population - 
only has average economic old-age dependency; the USA - a country that is not aging 
quickly and has high employment - is in an excellent position, whereas Europe suffers 
from rapid aging and low employment. 
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2.4   How reliable are forecasts over such a long period of time? 
Forecasts are by their nature unreliable. However, although demographic forecasts often cover 
long periods of time, they cover a much narrower range between extreme scenarios than do 
economic forecasts. The reason for this is that in the year 2000 we already know how many 
old people - let us say those over 65 years old - there will be in the year 2030, because they 
are the people who are aged over 35 today. Demographic forecasts that "only" look forward 
one generation are therefore largely projections and not really forecasts. Uncertainties are due 
to changes in medical developments and - above all - immigration, which is very difficult to 
forecast. In contrast, incorrect estimates of the birth rate only have very long-term effects. 
Appropriate scenarios are shown in Figure 4, applying to Germany, but similar ranges of 
deviations from the middle projection apply to the countries in Europe. 
Figure 4: Old-age dependency ratio associated with various population forecasts for 
Germany 
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Source: Combination of Figure 3 for Germany with variants from Birg/Börsch-Supan (1999). 
Notes: B1: strong aging, constant fertility; B2: modest aging, constant fertility; B3: modest aging, increasing 
fertility; B4: weak aging, increasing fertility. Constant and increasing fertility respectively signifies a constant 
birth rate at 1.35 and an increasing birth rate at 1.64 by 2050; modest, weak and strong aging signifies an 
increase in life expectancy by 2050 of 6 years (4.5 years and 7.5 years, respectively) with annual net 
immigration of 120,000 persons (20,000 and 220,000 persons respectively). Employment: Scenario E2, cf. 
section 2.5. 
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In spite of the range between demographic forecasts, which cannot be ignored, three 
characteristics of demographic trends are undisputable: 
• At the moment, we are experiencing the calm before the storm and perhaps even a 
"following wind in demographic terms" because the baby-boomers are currently in the 
most productive phase of their lives. 
• The actual aging phase will take place in the years between 2010 and 2030. Economic 
old-age dependency, which currently stands at approximately 56 pensioners per 100 
economically active persons, will increase to 80 to 90 pensioners per 100 employed 
persons (i.e. around 45 - 70%). 
• After this, the ratio will remain relatively stable for a long period. The influence of the 
birth rate will have very little effect until 2050. Under no circumstances will we return to 
today's conditions for the foreseeable future. 
2.5   How will employment change? 
One may argue that employment will adapt to the demographic development and the higher 
salaries in real terms that can be expected and consequently the information provided by 
mechanistic demographic forecasts only has limited validity when applied to the economy. 
Although it is correct that much higher employment can cushion the negative effects of an 
aging population, it is not sufficient to compensate for it because the demographic change 
here is much too far reaching (Börsch-Supan, 1998). This can be seen in Figure 5.  
Figure 5: Labor force in Germany, 2000-2050 [in millions] 
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Source: Börsch-Supan (2000b). Note: Scenarios E1 - E3 correspond to the employment forecast variants 
explained in the text. 
 
While the variant population projections only begin to diverge significantly after the year 
2040, assumptions regarding the size of the working population are critical for estimating how 
the labor supply will develop in the coming decades (Börsch-Supan, 2002b). Figure 5 shows 
the probable trend ("E2 Scenario") between two extreme assumptions. In the pessimistic E1 
scenario, we assume that current employment rates also apply in the future, whereas the E3 
scenario represents a very optimistic trend in which the rate of employment for women almost 
converges with the rate for men, the retirement age increases from 60 to 65 and the 
unemployment rate falls to 4%. In our view, these two scenarios form the greatest range of 
possible developments. The probable E2 scenario lies in between. With this scenario, the rate 
of female employment increases from 64% to 74% and thus moves by just under two-thirds 
towards the current male employment rate of almost 80%. The retirement age will increase 
from 60 to 62.5 and the unemployment rate will drop to 5% by 2030. 
Therefore, irrespective of which of these very different assumptions one feels is the most 
likely, the following facts remain: The number of economically active persons will fall 
sharply. And, even if the employment rates - as assumed in the middle E2 scenario - increase, 
the absolute figure for employed persons will be lower than the figure in 2000: in the long 
term approximately 8 million fewer persons will be in employment. The offering on the labor 
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market will contract, probably by more than twice the current number of unemployed. This 
decline will mainly take place in the 25 years between 2010 and 2035. 
2.6   Demographic challenges 
The macroeconomic challenges and the implications for capital markets are now becoming 
clear. In 20 - 30 years there will be the same number of consumers, who will also have 
become used to a considerably higher level of consumption than today's generation of 
pensioners, but the labor force to produce these consumer goods and services will be 
considerably smaller.1 How can this be successfully managed? Firstly, we can import more 
from abroad. However, these imports must be financed so that in the long term this strategy 
will result in a reversal of the current flows for the balance of trade and payments. In this 
context, it helps if the imports are manufactured in companies which, although they are 
located abroad, are financed by German capital (direct investments). Within the domestic 
economy, higher consumption production per employee can only be achieved by considerably 
higher labor productivity. This, in turn, requires higher capital intensity and more highly 
qualified employees.2 
The aging of the population as a result of the shortage of labor will therefore not only have 
repercussions for the employment market but it will also have far-reaching implications for 
capital markets Firstly, capital must increasingly take the place of work and, secondly, we will 
invest greater amounts of capital abroad and, in turn, we will then import from these foreign 
production facilities and thus exploit the advantage of international diversification. As has 
already been highlighted in the introduction to this study, it demonstrates the complex 
background against which the "asset meltdown" effect has to be analysed. 
In other respects, it should be pointed out here that the real purpose of the reforms to our 
social insurance systems must be seen within this context. It is not only about providing a 
social safety net for people in old age: it is also to prepare for a production structure that 
allows an increasingly high proportion of consumption by a diminishing number of people in 
the labor force. In 2030 the proportion of consumption by those who are not in paid 
 
1 We are proceeding under the assumption that demand essentially continues to be stable thanks to an income 
situation that remains favourable. Here income in retirement is supplemented by funded incomes to the same 
extent as the level as pay-as-you-go pensions decrease (Riester model). Cf. section 4. 
2 The relationship between aging, labor productivity and capital intensity is a complex process. It is not clear 
whether and to what extent labor productivity will fall because employees are getting older. On the one hand, 
physical strength and the speed of cognitive responses decline but this is balanced by more experience, 
organizational knowledge and similar "soft factors". In a knowledge-centric society, this plays an increasingly 
important role. In addition, greater capital intensity has a considerable impact on services, in particular through 
the use of information technology. Cf. Börsch-Supan (2002). 
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employment will be over 50%. This can only be financed by supplementing the pay-as-you-
go process by a much more substantial funded pillar. Firstly, it helps to alleviate the 
demographic burden of the pension insurance system by spreading the load over time. 
Secondly, it goes some way to meeting the need to deploy capital in the German economy 
more intensively and to introduce global diversification. Capital markets help to reconcile the 
necessary microeconomic adjustments with the socio-political objectives. 
Besides the dreaded "asset meltdown" hypothesis there are consequently also a considerable 
number of very positive aspects for capital markets. The overall context must be examined 
before one can draw a valid conclusion. It is intended that this study will make a contribution 
here. 
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3. Previous "Asset Meltdown" Studies 
 
Different authors have investigated the implications of demographic change on capital 
markets from a variety of angles and especially the subject of "asset meltdown". Work first 
started on this subject in the late 1980s, when Mankiw and Weil (1989) predicted a drop in 
real estate prices in the USA as a result of demographics. In section 3.1 we will present this 
work and the lively discussion it provoked. 
It is clear that banks and insurance companies are taking an interest and this is based on two 
main aspects. On the one hand, the demographic change alters the structure of the customer 
base with correspondingly different requirements. On the other hand, institutional investors, 
i.e. life insurance companies and the pension funds, require long-term growth forecasts for the 
various investment segments in order to advise their customers and for portfolio management. 
The "practical analyses", which we summarize in section 3.2, are designed, firstly, to forecast 
market segments that will grow in the future and, secondly, to make long-term forecasts of 
returns in the broadly defined investment categories of "equities", "bonds" and "real estate“. 
Empirical and theoretical research into the "asset meltdown" hypothesis has also been 
undertaken by the university sector. The critical point in the empirically based analyses 
presented in section 3.3 lies in the assumptions about the savings profile over the life cycle, 
the stability of which over the period of prediction is crucial for the results. These analyses are 
affected by additional problems on account of the database, which in some instances is not 
good. The more recent research therefore returns to theoretical economic models, particularly 
more complex dynamic portfolio models which have recently been given impetus through the 
increased use of more powerful computers. The inclusion of the demographic change in such 
theoretical models mainly occurs within the framework of models of overlapping generations 
(OLG models) and this will also be the procedure adopted in this study. The results of earlier 
work are summarized in section 3.4. 
3.1  How it all began – Mankiw-Weil 
A fall in the price of assets as a result of demographics was predicted for the first time in 1989 
by Mankiw and Weil for the real estate market in the United States. Mankiw and Weil used 
cross-sectional data on real estate assets from the 1970 US census to develop an age profile of 
the demand for property. Their demand forecast is based on the assumption that this age 
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profile remains constant and it is only the size and age structure of the US population that will 
change. Based on the historical correlation for the growth in demand with the price index for 
investments in residential buildings (residential investment deflator) and corresponding 
regressions, Mankiw and Weil conclude that the demand for residential property must 
increase by approximately 1.5% per year to keep prices constant. However, the 
demographically controlled demand variable shows consistently lower growth rates for the 
period 1990 - 2010. This forecast discrepancy exercises enormous price pressure on the 
residential property market. The point estimate by Mankiw and Weil implies a 47% price fall 
within 20 years. These alarming results unleashed the agitation one would expect, especially 
in the daily newspapers.  
The study provoked a large number of very critical comments, which ultimately cast 
considerable doubt on whether the forecasts by Mankiw and Weil (1989, 1992) are 
sustainable. Woodward (1991) grouped together the main points of criticism in the first series 
of responses refuting the study. For instance, both Hamilton (1991) and Hendershott (1991) 
criticized the fact that the estimates of Mankiw and Weil imply that, even if demand remains 
at a constant level, the prices would fall by 8%. This implausible linear time trend has a much 
greater influence on the forecast than the decline in the growth for demand from 1.6% at the 
start of the 1980s to around 0.6% in approximately 2000. Swan (1995) criticized that not only 
were the effects of a long-term rise in real income completely ignored but the supply side of 
the residential property market was also not taken into account3. 
Engelhardt and Poterba (1991) also cast doubt on the findings of Mankiw and Weil. They 
made an equivalent analysis for Canada, a country with demographic trends that very largely 
mirror those in the USA. The age profile for real estate assets in Canada also broadly 
corresponds to the equivalent figures in the USA. In spite of this, Engelhardt and Poterba 
could not find that demography had any similar influence along the lines identified by 
Mankiw and Weil. 
Börsch-Supan (1993) undertook for Germany a parallel study to Mankiw and Weil, which 
was similar to the Engelhardt and Poterba study in Canada. This analysis, too, was limited to 
the demand side of the property market but the areas where an aging society has an impact 
were covered in much greater detail that in the study by Mankiw and Weil. Börsch-Supan 
explained in detail the effect of the demographic change on the demand for residential 
 
3 In the 1970s and 1980s the supply side of the real estate market was influenced by rising raw material prices, 
which - in addition to the increased demand from the baby boomers - could also have been responsible for the 
price movement observed. 
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property. Firstly, the increase in life expectancy boosts demand because each residential 
property is needed for a longer period before it becomes free for the next generation.  Added 
to this is the fact that typically the average size of a household decreases when the occupants 
become old, thus increasing the living space required per person (also see section 6). The 
seventh coordinated population census carried out by the Federal Statistical Office and used 
by Börsch-Supan at the time does not show a reduction in household numbers until approx. 
2020, using the corresponding age-specific household ratios, even though this population 
census forecasted a fall in the population as early as 2000. Thirdly, there is also what are 
called the cohort effects of demand for residential property. Greater demand for living space 
exists among cohorts born later, above all relating to income and assets. All in all, Börsch-
Supan established that these effects will remain balanced at least until 2020 and what can be 
expected in the next two decades is at most a slight drop. 
More recent research has shown how important this last effect is. When Mankiw and Weil 
used cross-sectional data to analyse the demand for residential property over the life cycle 
they ignored the effects of income and the cohort group, which have proved to be very 
important in quantitative terms. In cross-sectional data, i.e. in data from many people at a 
single point in time of observation, it is not possible to decide whether a person saves too 
much because they are old (age effect) or because they were born a long time ago at a time 
when, for instance, thrift was considered to be particularly virtuous (cohort effect).  If one 
applies this approach to demand for residential property, it cannot be ascertained whether a 
person uses a small amount of living space because they do not need a large apartment when 
they are old or whether they do not need a large apartment in old age because at the time 
when they purchased their apartment they did not have enough real income to afford a large 
apartment. In their analysis, Mankiw and Weil present the cross-sectional profile of real estate 
assets in 1980 by way of comparison. However, the assets values of census data in 1980 were 
on average more than 50% above the 1970 sample group for each age group. When it comes 
to using demand profiles for fairly long-term forecasts, the order of magnitude of 50% shows 
the quantitative significance of income-related effects, in particular, but also other cohort 
effects. The increase in the assets profiles of all age groups between 1970 and 1980 illustrate 
the dimension in which the demand for real estate could also change in the future.  
Studies made in the United States of America that adopt a more careful approach than 
Mankiw and Weil verify that, for just these reasons, the estimates of age-specific demand for 
residential accommodation are distorted and a possible "asset meltdown" effect is greatly 
exaggerated - for example, see Venti and Wise (1990), McFadden (1994), and Skinner (1996). 
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What can, however, be noted is that the forecast "asset meltdown" on the American market 
has not occurred to date, either during the boom in equity markets (which is easy to explain) 
or since the bubble burst (which is more significant). 
3.2 Practitioners’ studies 
The effects of demographic change on capital markets were soon recognized as a possible 
problem by the financial services sector and it became a topic of discussion. By way of an 
example, we are presenting five studies here which provide a practical demonstration of the 
different aspects on which analysts focus. 
The first practical study that we are aware of that deals with possible asset meltdown on the 
residential property market was made by Hypovereinsbank (Heigl, 2000). It is, however, 
limited to eastern Germany. On the one hand, the example of eastern German illustrates 
clearly how a drop in demand caused by aging and, above all, migration may cause a 
deterioration of asset values in the property market. On the other hand, it must be noted that 
the development in the eastern states of Germany over the last few years cannot be compared 
directly with the demographic change because they occurred much more suddenly and also 
their dimensions cannot be compared with the slow changes prompted by low birth rates and 
greater longevity. 
A second publication by Hypovereinsbank (Heigl, 2001) that appeared in the German press 
became the subject of considerable attention. It remains the only study that warned about an 
asset meltdown in equity markets that needed to be taken seriously. The initial variable of the 
study is the numerical relationship of economically active persons between 30 and 59, who 
are identified as "savers", with the group aged over 60 and who it is assumed will draw on 
their savings, as they are pensioners. Heigl describes the curve showing these demography 
variables as the "Age Wave". It correlates these demographic variables with the annual net 
acquisition of financial assets. There is a strong positive correlation between the two time 
series - the coefficient of correlation is, according to Heigl, 86%. 
Heigl then compares the "Age Wave" with share prices. He selects a logarithmic form of the 
DAX in real terms and superimposes the "Age Wave" over this. For the period from 1964 to 
1974 the two curves are flat curves, although they are not obviously correlated. Whereas the 
"Age Wave" rises sharply in two thrusts from 1974 to 1990, the DAX remains comparatively 
unchanged in real values until 1984, in other words ten years later. Then, between 1984 and 
1999, the graph of the DAX shows a similarly steep rise as the "Age Wave" did ten years 
earlier. Consequently, Heigl infers that the response of actual share prices to the "Age Wave" 
occurs with a time lag of around 10 years.  
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. 
Heigl now applies this delayed response to future development. If the underlying conditions 
were to remain the same, the consequence of Heigl's demographic variables would be that by 
2030 equity prices would fall in real terms to the level of 1964.4 Were the curve to continue 
to the year 2050, it would even imply negative values on the log DAX scale
In our opinion, neither the analysis nor the forecast is tenable for several reasons. Firstly, the 
basic assumption - only those in the 30 - 59 age group who are economically active save 
whereas pensioners aged over 60 draw on their savings - agrees with some economic theories 
but it does not concur with the facts in the majority of other European countries, as is 
dramatically demonstrated in Figure 6. Only the Netherlands show some sign of dissaving, 
due to the large proportion of retirement income drawn from mandatory occupational 
pensions. 
Figure 6: Cohort-corrected savings rates by age 
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(2001); Italy: Brugiavini and Padula (2001); Netherlands: Alessie and Kapteyn (2001). 
 
                                                 
4 The demographic variables reach the 1964 level in 2020. The time lag of 10 years is then added to this. 
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Modern empirical savings research, which is summarized from an international viewpoint in 
studies such as Poterba (1992) and Börsch-Supan (2003), shows that, although pensioners 
save less than younger people, they do not draw on their savings, i.e. on average they make 
more new savings than they release in existing assets. For Germany this is clearly 
demonstrated in Börsch-Supan and Essig (2002) and in Börsch-Supan, Reil-Held and 
Schnabel (2003), which have been used as a basis for Figure 6. Here income and cohort 
effects are also taken into account. 
Secondly, it remains unclear why it is specifically logarithmically scaled real share prices 
with a 10-year time lag from the absolute value of the ratio that should trigger from saving to 
drawing on savings. Although by superimposing two graphs it produces an impressive chart, 
it has no statistical basis, particularly as the logarithmic scale delivers meaningless results in 
the long term. If one were to select 5 or 15 years instead of 10 years, which would be just as 
arbitrary, the correlation would largely disappear. 
Finally, it should be noted that the study is assuming the existence of a "catch-up effect" in 
equity markets, which will continue until around 2015 and is the result of the accumulation of 
funded old-age provision in Germany. However, the forecast ignores that the net effect of an 
across-the-board Riester pension set at 4% will persist until approx. 2050, cf. Birg und 
Börsch-Supan (1999). It is also unclear how strong the connection between the two effects - 
the catch-up effect and the "Age Wave" - is and to what extent this catch-up effect 
compensates for the forecast which is based on the "Age Wave" calculation alone. 
The Goldman Sachs (Culhane, 2001) study has also been extensively quoted. This 
concentrates on the forecast of future market volumes and the volume factor in a potential 
"asset meltdown". In a comprehensive examination this places the future development in the 
context of global finance markets. After an extensive survey of the different course of 
demographic change in the industrial nations, an overview is provided of the different pension 
schemes that exist and how they are financed. Along similar lines to those adopted by 
Hypovereinsbank, Goldman Sachs also uses as the key variable the ratio of "Prime Savers" – 
defined as the 40-59 age group – to "dissavers" – defined as those aged over 60. A trend for 
the household sector's expected net savings is derived from this. Linked to the current and 
assumed future development of the pension provision system structure - fully funded (e.g. 
USA, UK), capital funding being implemented (e.g. Germany) or "pay as you go" (e.g. Italy) - 
this, in turn, forecasts net savings and portfolio restructuring in non-private old-age provision. 
These forecasts, which have largely deliberately restricted themselves to qualitative criteria, 
emphasize four important results. Firstly, Japan - as the economy that is aging the fastest - 
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will be affected the most. Secondly, in capital markets in countries in which funded old-age 
provision already plays a major role and where the proportion of equities is high (e.g. USA, 
UK), portfolios will be restructured to switch from equities into bonds. Thirdly, the study 
ascribes better development chances to the equity markets in countries where capital funded 
systems are only now gradually gaining significance, because demand generated in this way 
counteracts "desaving" processes determined by demographic factors. Lastly, the fourth 
forecast is the one made by Goldman Sachs that increasing use will be made of diversification 
opportunities on capital markets. 
Although many basic assumptions of this study are similar to those made by the 
Hypovereinsbank, the results are much less alarming. The reason for this is essentially the 
long-term cushioning effect of the global options for diversification and the effect of 
accumulating funded old-age provision. The Goldman Sachs study does not however offer a 
quantitative calculation structure and it also assumes that capital returns will remain stable in 
the long term - an assumption which the "asset meltdown" hypothesis in particular casts doubt 
upon. An important task of our own study - and for this please see sections 4 to 6 below - is to 
assess not only the future volumes but also future returns by means of a model in which the 
quantitative aspects are transparent. 
The Dresdner Bank study (Bulthaupt et al., 2001) also only touched on the forecast of long-
term returns. Above all, the study looks at the potential for developing the market for various 
products, in particular investment funds, life insurance policies and the various ways of 
organizing company pension schemes, which are arising in various European countries in the 
light of the urgent need for reform. What it has in common with the Goldman Sachs study is 
that both are emphasizing the role of globalisation on capital markets. In addition, the 
Dresdner Bank explicitly looks at the demand side of capital markets - an aspect which is 
ignored in many other studies. Bulthaupt et al. argue that the concern about an "asset 
meltdown" is without foundation on account of the scope for international diversification. The 
Eastern European countries with their far lower per capita capital stock and other OECD 
countries, which are faced with a much less dramatic demographic change than Germany, are 
seen as attractive countries in which to invest.  The countries that increasingly need to invest 
the capital for old-age provision are therefore exporters of capital, before capital imports take 
the upper hand after the baby-boomers retire. Evidence that international capital mobility can 
cushion the effects that an aging society has on capital returns when compared to a closed 
economy has been provided by researchers such as Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003) 
as part of an OLG model - also see section 4. However, their conclusion in no way implies 
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that the effects of demographic change will be fully compensated by international 
diversification within OECD countries. The extent to which this situation can be absorbed by 
the emerging markets and the newly industrialized countries of Eastern Europe in order to 
compensate for the residual effects is not answered by the Dresdner Bank study, particularly 
because their time frame up to 2010 at most only covers the medium term.  
A study published by the German Insurance Association (Gesamtverband der deutschen 
Versicherungswirtschaft) (Lueg, Ruprecht and Wolgast, 2003) provides a comprehensive 
overview of the controversial discussion from an economic point of view, emphasizing the 
implications for funded pension schemes. It interprets - in a genuinely original way - the 
discussion on the feared "asset meltdown" as one facet of a revived variation of the 
"Mackenroth thesis". The quantitative arguments of this study have been evolved in parallel 
to those in section 4 and consequently reference is made to these. 
A fundamental aspect of the practical studies is that the arguments they raise identify and 
discuss many important points. Only the Hypovereinsbank studies consider that the 
demographic change represents a serious risk for capital markets. The quantitative forecasts 
are however almost exclusively based on ad hoc assumptions and are limited to market 
volumes whereas they nearly always steer clear of forecasting how trends will develop. There 
is a lack of theoretical modelling or a reliable empirical foundation for saving and portfolio 
decisions over the life cycle. Where the forecasts are based on empirical data for savings 
behavior, all practical studies misinterpret the cross-sectional data used as life cycle profiles. 
This procedure ignores the empirical evidence of cohort and income effects, which may result 
in potentially serious incorrect forecasts. In sections 4 to 6 this study will attempt to pay 
greater attention to these points. 
3.3  Scientific analyses on an empirical basis  
The most familiar scientific study based on the empirical data of saving behavior over the life 
cycle is the analysis by Poterba (2001). He uses a procedure that is essentially similar to that 
used by Mankiw and Weil (1989). It derives a demand variable from the shift in the aging 
structure of the population, which is produced from an estimated life cycle savings profile. In 
contrast to Mankiw and Weil, Poterba estimates the demand from the various age classes in a 
model which permits explicit cohort effects. The estimated asset profile in old age is very 
largely flat - a result that has already been documented by other authors. Differential mortality 
(Attanasio and Hoynes, 1995), i.e. the fact that wealthy households live for longer than poor 
ones, is an important reason for this. Poterba uses a series of further demographic variables 
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which can explain the accumulation of savings in a society.5 For long time series he finds 
hardly any indications that demography influences returns on equity investments and only 
minimal indications of such influences on the market for secure interest-bearing securities. It 
was only for the price-earnings ratio of equities that Poterba found demography had historical 
influences but these were not stable.6 The estimated parameters led Poterba to the conclusion 
that a demographically induced fall in prices on financial markets, as had been predicted by 
Mankiw and Weil for the real estate market, is extremely unlikely. 
Abel (2002) criticized the analysis by Poterba (2001) because, like Mankiw and Weil (1989), 
he did not include the supply side of capital markets. In a theoretical model in which the 
households are interested in the well-being of their heirs and thus possess an inheritance 
motive, he shows that it is entirely feasible for an asset meltdown to be consistent with a flat 
asset profile in old age.  Abel's basic idea is as follows: Whereas the generation of parents 
deliberately do not use up all their assets in order to allow their children to inherit, the 
children save less in expectation of the forthcoming transfer of assets. On top of this, with 
declining numbers in the children's generation, the inheritance is divided between a smaller 
number so that each household in the small generation of heirs can reduce their savings by 
more than a household of the baby-boomer generation. Although the demand of the old 
generation for capital is not falling, a demographically induced fall in prices could be brought 
about through lower savings by the younger generation. However, quantitatively speaking, it 
is still unclear whether the amounts that will be inherited will fall with the number of children. 
Thus the counter mechanism to Poterba's analysis "discovered" by Abel would have less of an 
effect.  
As was emphasized in Section 3.2, separate recording of age and cohort effects in the context 
of accumulating savings is of key importance for the reliability of empirically based forecasts 
on the future development of capital markets and equally it is of central importance for their 
dependence on the age structure of the population. Here there may be differences between the 
cohorts in respect of their assets or they may simply be influenced by other experiences which 
motivate their savings behavior.  
Sommer (2002) uses a procedure developed by Deaton and Paxson (1994) to analyse savings 
behavior over the age profile, and cohort and year effects and he ascertained such cohort 
effects for various countries. The Italian data, in particular, indicated a flat age profile with 
 
5 Also including old-age dependency ratios similar to those in the practice studies presented above. 
6 Poterba used data for the USA, Canada, and Great Britain and also used partial time series, e.g. samples from 
1926-1999, 1946-1999 and 1926-1975 for the USA. 
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considerable differences between the cohorts. In view of their order of magnitude, the 
estimated cohort effects are of very great importance for long-term forecasts of demand on the 
capital market. 
For the USA Poterba and Samwick (1997) found strong cohort effects for the percentages of 
individual product groups in portfolios as well as for the proportion of households that have 
certain products in their portfolios (what are termed "participation rates"). Sommer (2003) 
also found strong cohort effects for Germany, in particular with respect to "participation 
rates". The extent to which these product-specific analyses can be used to forecast the extent 
of future demand is, however, limited because the data is generally restricted to the product 
level and investments held indirectly in insurance policies or investments held in mixed 
investment funds in the form of equities, bonds and real estate are not taken into account. It 
can however be established that neither Poterba and Samwick (1997) in the USA nor Sommer 
(2002) in Germany found significant evidence that households move into secure investments 
as they grow older. Within the context of the "asset meltdown" debate this means that there is 
not likely to be an excessive fall in average returns on account of demographics but also the 
returns on individual investments (in this case: equities and fixed-interest securities) are not 
likely to experience any excessive shifts. 
Coincidentally, Poterba and Samwick established additional cohort effects through the 
distribution of new products. The stability of age profiles, which have been estimated with the 
help of cross-sectional data at an individual point in time, is further called into question 
because new products (e.g. share products with a capital guarantee and investment funds) may 
enhance the attractiveness of individual forms of investment for all age groups. 
Finally, some authors have used time series data from the past to draw conclusions for the 
future, i.e. to extrapolate values for the future from historical demographic changes (Higgins, 
1998; Lührmann, 2002; Eichengreen and Fifer, 2002). The results of these analyses provide 
evidence that demography has a clear influence on financial markets but some of this data is, 
however, contradictory and does not allow accurate projections to be made. The main reason 
for this is that the basis on which the projection is made is extremely weak. The demographic 
change that awaits us in the next few decades does not have any historical precedence. What 
is more, such projections in the past ignore the adaptive and feedback economic effects that 
are not activated, which usually exercise a moderating influence on the long-term 
development.  
Overall, these empirically based scientific studies give the all-clear in respect of a catastrophic 
"asset meltdown". Nevertheless, the basis on which their projections are made do not 
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correspond to the expected demographic changes expected historically. This is the main 
reason why, in this study, we are using a simulated model supported by theory. 
3.4  Theoretical modelling and simulation models 
Initial approaches for using theoretically supported methods to estimate the effects of 
demographic changes on the development of the economy overall and thus also on wages and 
returns on capital can be found in Cutler et al. (1990), Börsch-Supan (1996), and Reisen 
(2000). More recent work is based on what are called the models of overlapping generations 
("OLG models"), which were used for concrete political analysis for the first time in the 
leading-edge research by Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Since then, such models have 
undergone considerable development processes, enabling them to mirror reality more closely. 
The models have thus increasingly developed from semi-theoretical analytical tools to 
genuine forecasting and simulation models (INGENUE, 2002). One of the important 
contributions in this respect was achieved by the implementation of realistic demographic 
data (Börsch-Supan, Heiss, Ludwig and Winter, 2003; Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 
2003). 
The main outcome of these studies, which are strongly geared to the economy as a whole and 
thus describe a single, consolidated overall economic return on productive capital, i.e. not the 
difference between a return from risky equities and the secure interest from bonds, is a partial 
all-clear. Depending on the country, the demographic change will - in some cases - even have 
a very considerable effect on capital markets. The various mechanisms of effect counteract 
each other in some cases, thus cushioning or emphasizing their effects.  They do not forecast a 
catastrophic "asset meltdown" and Cutler et al. even point out that, in addition to the well-
know challenges, the demographic change also brings "opportunities". We will look at these 
again in section 4. 
In the meantime, a small number of theoretically supported simulation models have been 
developed for portfolio selection, which can be used to analyse the effects of demographic 
change and estimate how great the risk of "asset meltdown" is. The analysis by Constantinides 
et al. (2002) helps us, even if only indirectly, to understand how households' portfolios alter 
during demographic change. It is of interest to the "asset meltdown" debate because it 
differentiates between the returns from more risky equities and the safe interest from bonds 
and examines how demand for these two types of investment depends on the age of the person 
concerned. It ultimately accords a higher priority to the risk premium of less certain 
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investments than it does to secure interest rates when considering optimum portfolio 
allocation over the life cycle. 
Constantinides et al. use a greatly simplified model. An understanding of this model is very 
helpful for portfolio analysis because it provides an approach to explain the so-called "Equity 
Premium Puzzle", i.e. the higher return on equities relative to fixed-interest securities, a topic 
first raised by Mehra and Prestcott (1985). We use this approach as a basis when in section 5 
we model the returns from equities and fixed-interest securities and how these depend on 
demographic factors. In the model by Constantinides et al. the supply of fixed-interest bonds 
and equities is fixed, i.e. the corporate sector does not grow and it does not restructure its 
financing portfolio. Three generations, consisting of young employees, old employees and 
pensioners, each live simultaneously. The employed generations earn income, with the 
younger generation earning less than the older generation. Pensioners do not receive any 
income so each generation must save during their working life to finance their consumption in 
retirement. With no limit to taking out loans, the young generation consumes, in some cases 
through borrowing, and at the same invests in the higher-yielding equity market, again using 
loans. However, when the credit available to households is limited, the so-called "Equity 
Premium" kicks in. This is a higher rate of return on equities over and above the normal risk 
premium. With available credit limited, the young generation would now have to reduce their 
consumption to finance the involvement in the equity market that they actually want, but 
which they only do in part because their consumption brings considerable benefits. Whereas 
the young generation is hardly active at all on the capital market, the generation of pensioners 
does not find any suppliers for the fixed-interest bonds they would like to buy. Thus the 
returns on fixed-interest bonds falls, whereas - at the same time - companies have to offer 
their equities with higher returns. This creates the spread of returns - the "Equity Premium" - 
between shares and fixed-interest bonds.  
Brooks (2002) takes up this theoretical model, extends it to include more flexible modelling 
on the supply side and applies it to the possible consequences the baby-boom may have for 
capital markets. When the baby-boomers reach the second phase of their working life, when 
they no longer have children to support but, at the same time, their work-related earnings are 
at their highest level, the "Equity Premium" shrinks considerably under the increased demand 
for equities for old-age provision, only to rise to a maximum after the baby-boomers retire. 
We present a similar analysis in section 6 but this time focussing on European financial 
markets. There, too, the "Equity Premium" is rising in the long term, whereas the returns for 
fixed-interest bonds falls as a result of the population aging. The effects we calculated are, 
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however, far less serious than those predicted by Brooks. This is due to the fact that, unlike 
Brooks, we did not map the demographic change as three generations but instead we mapped 
it on a year-by-year basis and thus were able to obtain a much more realistic result.  
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4. OLG Simulations: Rate of Return on Productive Capital 
 
Based on the theories that we have taken from the groundwork summarized in the previous 
sections, in this section we are presenting a simulation model with which we are analysing 
how demographic change will affect the overall economic return on productive capital and 
savings. Section 5 then differentiates this analysis within the framework of a dynamic 
portfolio model according to risky equities, fixed-interest securities (with no interest rate risk 
but with a price risk) and secure investments (i.e. with no interest or price risk). Finally, 
section 6 deals with the developments that can be expected on the property market. The 
"MEA-OLGA" simulation model used here further develops the variant developed at the 
Mannheim research institute "The Economics of Aging" (MEA) (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and 
Winter, 2002; Börsch-Supan, Heiss, Ludwig and Winter, 2003; Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and 
Winter, 2003). 
4.1  A model of overlapping generations: The MEA-OLGA model 
Savings, capital returns and international capital flows are the outcome of complex 
interactions between supply and demand on German and international capital markets, 
influenced by demography and the capital and goods markets. Our simulation model 
calculates this equilibrium by drawing on model households which mirror the various 
generations living together during the phase of demographic transformation ("overlapping 
generations", abbreviated as OLG). Such models have a long tradition. They were developed 
as theoretical models by Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1964) and extended by Auerbach 
and Kotlikoff (1987) to be used for the first time in a near-reality computer simulation model. 
The MEA-OLGA simulation model on which the results of this section are based is the first 
such model that is not restricted to one country but also covers international trade and capital 
movements. Details, including a mathematical description, of the MEA-OLGA model can be 
found in Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter (2003). Here we are limiting ourselves to the 
essential mechanisms of effect and equations for this model, which takes a long-term 
perspective and is thus neo-classical, abstaining from all short-term Keynesian considerations. 
This also justifies the assumption that exchange rates have no role to play in our real 
economic model. 
(a) How households behave: 
The model households in the MEA-OLGA model offer a fixed amount of work. They divide 
their income into consumption and savings but here we only map the long-term savings, i.e. 
the savings that are required to compensate for the drop in income upon retirement. The 
accumulation of savings is therefore mapped by the life cycle hypothesis model in which the 
household does not apportion distribution of income into consumption and saving each year 
but over a time scale that is only limited by the households' discount rate. Consumption Ct is 
smoothed by this long-term life planning so that it greatly depends on consumption in the 
preceding period Ct-1. Impatient consumers (their discount rate ρ exceeds the market rate rt) 
initially consume a large amount but, in contrast, patient households initially save and their 
discount rate of ρ is lower than the market interest rate rt. The development over time of 
consumption Ct is therefore produced from the following simple equation in which the ratio 
between the discount rate and the market interest rate is weighted by the parameter σ, which 
states the extent to which households react to deviations between the discount rate and the 
market interest rate: 
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This consumption equation implicitly also describes the savings decision because current 
income minus expenditure on consumption gives the figure for savings. This is added, with 
interest, to asset At+1 of the next period: 
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The retirement insurance scheme has a crucial influence on savings decisions because this is 
the main source of income during retirement, albeit supplemented by cashing in household 
savings, for instance in the form of what is termed the "Riester pension".  Our model only 
maps long-term savings in the form of provision for old age. If the pay-as-you-go retirement 
insurance scheme is so generous that the level of pension is 100%, no long-term savings at all 
occur in our model. If, at the other extreme, the level of pension falls to zero, all the income in 
old age must be provided from savings. Consumption is correspondingly lower in younger 
years. 
Savings are invested in productive capital. These investments can either be in Germany or 
abroad. The international portfolio shows that capital moves to where the returns, after 
adjustment for risk and tax, are the highest and this remains so until the balance between risk- 
and tax-adjusted returns is the same in all countries. 
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(b) Production side, capital market and overall economic balance 
On the production side, capital and work are used as a substitute so that the wages correspond 
to work productivity and the capital return corresponds to capital productivity. We are 
modelling this using a so-called Cobb-Douglas production function, which converts GNP Yi,t, 
- work Li,t and capital Ki,t in units of goods and services produced. Here the indices t and i 
stand for year t and country i. 
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All countries have the same production technology F, but labor productivity varies Θi,t. Also, 
the entire workforce Li,t is composed of the various age groups Li,a,t, whose age-specific 
productivities εa correspond to the average wage profile.7 
The different productivity levels Θi,t correspond to the different per capita gross domestic 
products. The available quantity of work Li,a,t is derived from the demographic assumptions 
presented in section 2. 
Wages and interest rates are determined in such a way that they correspond to work 
productivity and capital productivity, respectively. In particular, the interest is produced from 
the marginal productivity of the capital deployed minus the rate of depreciation δ:8 
( )   ,, δ−′= itit kfr  
and the investments made in the domestic economy from the net change of the domestic 
capital stock: 
ititit KKI ,,1, )1( δ−−= +  
Capital Ki,t, which is used in a country for production does not have to correspond to the 
assets that the inhabitants of this country have accumulated and which we have described as 
At. The difference 
Vi,t = Ai,t – Ki,t  
is represented by the assets abroad. If more is saved than invested, the capital flows abroad - 
for instance, in the form of direct investments - as described above, in other words until the 
                                                 
7 Rising until the age of 55 and then constant. 
8 To be more precise: From the marginal productivity of capital deployed per efficiency unit of work, therefore 
k=K/ΘL. The depreciation rate δ is assumed to be constant and uniform. 
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returns, adjusted for risk and tax, have converged in all countries. The current account surplus 
is therefore 
ititititit ISVVCA ,,,,1, )1( −=−−= + δ . 
If one takes all the regions of the world together, both the international capital flows and the 
net external positions of the various countries must cancel each other out overall, because the 
regions of the world form a closed economy. This is one of the key conditions for the 
equilibrium of international trade and our model: 
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The MEA-OLGA model is matched to the overall economic pattern in Germany from 1970 to 
1995, i.e. the model parameter is selected in such a way that the historical development is 
mapped as successfully as possible ("calibration"). The relevant parameters are listed and 
explained in the appendix. 
(c) How international capital movements are modelled: 
We first applied the MEAOLGA model to three scenarios for capital mobility: firstly, to 
Germany as a closed economy; secondly, to Germany as an open economy with perfect 
capital mobility within the other countries of the EU; thirdly, with perfect capital mobility 
within the other countries of the whole OECD. Perfect mobility of capital within the OECD 
may be an exaggerated assumption but not so within the EU, because by far most of the flows 
of capital are within the eurozone where there is free movement of capital. This also justifies 
the assumption that exchange rates have no role to play in the MEA-OLGA model. In 
addition, the model describes the very long-term trends in capital movements. Whereas the 
short-term exchange rate induces flows of capital movements which, although considerable, 
are of short duration and of less interest to us in the context of demography, the long-term 
exchange rate and the long-term capital flows are determined jointly by the fundamental 
variables of demography and overall economic development. This maps the MEA-OLGA 
model. 
(d) How further capital is accumulated as a result of old-age provision 
We mapped the potential scope of development of pension insurance with two scenarios: the 
curve to be expected after the Riester reform is between the two. The first scenario ("Retain 
the PAYG system in place prior to the Riester reform") keeps the net replacement rate (of 
approximately 70%) provided by the pay-as-you-go pension system. In this scenario the 
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contribution rate is raised from 19.5% to 25.7% in the year 2030 to finance aging-related 
additional costs. We call the second scenario the "freezing model". This systematic reform 
model stabilizes the contribution rate at 19.5%, so that the pay-as-you-go pension level falls 
to just under 51%; at the same time, the overall pension level remains constant with a 
resultant gradual transition to a pension system based on a substantially higher funded 
component. These are obviously two extreme scenarios. The present reform process will not 
permit a situation where the contribution rate rises to almost 26%; however, it is also unlikely 
that the contribution can be frozen so the most probable social policy development will be a 
figure between these two extremes. 
If the gaps in the pay-as-you-go pension insurance are fully plugged by individual capital 
formation, this increase in individual private provision will have displacement effects on other 
forms of household savings. The calibration of the model to the development of household 
savings between 1970 and 1995 indirectly produces displacement of around one third. In 
other words, two thirds of the individual private provision induced by the reduction in the 
replacement rate represents genuine savings which enhance the capital stock in the economy. 
4.2   The development of household savings 
Figures 7 and 8 show the development of the long-term savings rate for the two pension 
reform scenarios (no reform, systematic reform) and these, again, in relation to the three 
different assumptions on capital mobility (Germany as a closed market, free movement of 
capital in the EU, free movement of capital throughout the entire OECD). The savings rate, 
which the simulation model calculates, is the proportion of long-term savings of private 
households in relation to the available income of the household. This percentage is lower than 
the savings rate usually measured, which is approximately five percentage points higher in 
Germany and includes short-term savings (for holidays, purchases of consumer durables, etc), 
which are not at all sensitive to demographic factors and are thus of secondary importance for 
our simulation calculations. 
(a)  The purely demographic effect 
Let's start in Figure 7 with the scenario in which today's pension insurance system is not 
changed, i.e. under the fallacious assumption that the benefits of the current pay-as-you-go 
system will be continued at the present level and financed by increases in contributions, 
without employment being influenced by it. Figure 7 therefore shows the pure effect that an 
aging population has on the resultant savings rate, without the additional effect of a pension 
reform. 
Figure 7: Savings rate of private households, continuing with the current pay-as-you-go 
pension system (long-term savings of private households divided by available income of 
private households, the pension level of the pay-as-you-go system stays at 70%) 
 
Source: MEA-OLGA model (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2003). On the expression "long-term 
saving". See the "Germany" scenario in the text: All German savings are invested in Germany; "EU" 
scenario: All German savings are invested within the EU; "OECD" scenario: All German savings are 
invested in OECD countries. 
 
The savings rate follows the demographics very closely. After a phase of very slow decline, 
during the years in which "baby-boomers" are receiving the highest income and thus also 
saving the most, a rapid, demographically induced decline will follow from 2020 onwards, 
when the first "baby-boomers" start to retire. Overall, the savings rate will fall in the long 
term by approx. 4 percentage points. This decline is not particularly affected by international 
diversification options. 
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(b)  The effect of a funded pension reform  
Figure 8 shows the effect of a systematic pension reform, i.e. if the contribution rate is 
stabilized at 19.5% and the income in old age is secured by a corresponding amount of private 
pension provision. Pension reform of this kind will increase the savings rate considerably. 
Figure 8 also clearly highlights the importance of international diversification options. If all 
the funds for old-age provision have to be invested in Germany, the return on capital will fall 
much more sharply than would be the case with international diversification - see Figure 9. 
This will reduce the savings. In contrast, with systematic pension reform and international 
diversification, household savings increase by approximately three percentage points as 
compared with the initial situation in Figure 7, thus compensating for a major part of the 
decline in the savings rate due to demographics. 
Figure 8: Savings rate of private households with a partially capitalized pension reform 
(long-term savings of private households divided by the available income of private 
households; contribution to the pay-as-you-go pension system is limited to 20%) 
 
Source: MEA-OLGA model (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2003). On the expression "long-term 
saving". See the "Germany" scenario in the text: All German savings are invested in Germany; "EU" 
scenario: All German savings are invested within the EU; "OECD" scenario: All German savings are 
invested in OECD countries. The "leap" represents the increase in savings as a consequence of 
introducing the multi-pillar model because in our model the households make the payments for old-age 
provision that are necessary to maintain the level of pensions at the accustomed level. 
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4.3  Trends in returns on capital 
We now come to the central point of this section and that is the overall economic returns on 
productive capital, i.e. all machines ("equipment") and buildings ("plants") of the corporate 
sector. This return on capital falls when work is scarce and capital is relatively plentiful. Thus 
returns on capital tend to fall in countries that are aging. This effect is intensified by a 
pensions reform because then the supply of available capital increases. When the time comes 
that the invested assets are suddenly withdrawn as the baby-boomers retire and "consume" 
their accumulated assets, one may well conclude that the much cited "asset meltdown" with 
dramatic falls in returns will occur. 
There are no grounds for fearing this and definitely not to such a dramatic extent. Firstly, we 
have seen that household saving remains relatively stable and is even likely to fall. Thus the 
supply of capital becomes scarce and with it the rate of return on capital offered by the 
corporate sector rises. The boost is particularly due to the fact that an aging economy needs 
capital to take the place of labor and increase productivity. Also, the reduction in aggregated 
households savings - as can be seen in Figures 7 and 8 - will take place over a long period and 
is anticipated by capital markets because the demographic data is already well known. 
These aspects become clear in Figures 9 and 10. Once again, the first figure shows the actual 
effect of the aging population and the following figure shows the effect of a systematic 
pension reform. The most important finding however is that, although capital returns do 
actually fall with the demographics, the quantitative effects are relatively minor. 
The two figures present the long-term capital returns on total productive capital. This yield 
includes fixed-interest securities (industrial securities and bonds) as well as shares and direct 
investments. The basic rate of capital return is calculated in the model and corresponds 
closely with the empirical values in Börsch-Supan (1999) for the period 1970-1994. The level 
of return varies slightly, depending on the extent of international diversification in the 
portfolio. If one looks at productive capital in Germany and the EU, the returns in 2000 - the 
initial year - are approx. 7.7% but if the other OECD countries and particularly the USA are 
added, it edges up slightly to approximately 8%. 
(a)  The purely demographic effect 
Figure 9 starts with the scenario in which no pension reform takes place, in other words only 
the demographic effects are mapped. Overall, the maximum decline as a result of 
demographics until 2035 will be around 120 basis points and then this will only be in the 
fallacious situation whereby there will be no capital movements with foreign countries. In this 
case, capital returns will fall from 7.7% (2000) to 6.5% (2035). Where diversification is 
applied, the decline is reduced by 10 to 20 basis points; for diversification within the EU, the 
demography-related decline in capital return is from 7.7% to 6.7% and, within the OECD as a 
whole, from around 8% to 7%. 
 
Figure 9: Capital return if the present pay-as-you-go system is continued  
(long-term return on productive capital; pension level of the pay-as-you-go system remains at 
70%) 
 
Source: MEA-OLGA model (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2003). The "Germany" scenario: All 
German savings are invested in Germany; "EU" scenario: All German savings are invested within the 
EU; "OECD" scenario: All German savings are invested in OECD countries. 
 
(b)  The effect of a drastic pension reform  
The comparison with figure 10 shows the additional effect of a pension reform that focuses 
systematically on stable contributions. It reduces returns on capital because it creates an 
additional supply of capital. However, this effect is only significant in quantitative terms if 
international diversification options are excluded. In this case, capital returns fall by a further 
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40 base points in 2035. Where diversification takes place within the EU, this effect is reduced 
to approximately 20 basis points and, if the USA - which dominates capital markets in the 
other OECD countries - is included, the decrease in the rate of returns disappears almost 
completely as a result of  the funded pension reform. 
 
Figure 10: Return on capital in the case of a partially capitalized pension reform (long-term 
return on productive capital, contribution to the pay-as-you-go system is limited to 20%) 
 
Source: MEA-OLGA model (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2003). The "Germany" scenario: All 
German savings are invested in Germany; "EU" scenario: All German savings are invested within the 
EU; "OECD" scenario: All German savings are invested in OECD countries. 
 
4.4 The fairy tale of "asset meltdown" and the diversification effect of global capital 
markets 
There are two important messages here. Firstly, the fairy tale of "asset meltdown" is not 
applicable if both supply and demand on capital markets are carefully incorporated into the 
forecast. Secondly, international capital markets play an important role in balancing out the 
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remaining fluctuations in returns. Expressed in more contentious terms, it can be said that 
aging requires globalisation in order to cushion its macroeconomic effects. It is not difficult to 
understand the intuition behind this result and it is completely in line with the view in 
international trade. Different developments always provide the opportunity to balance these 
out through trade. In this case, different demographic trends in the OECD countries provide 
the opportunity and international capital movements the mechanism to allow national 
differences in population and gainful employment to be balanced out to the benefit of all 
countries. Even when we were looking at the figures on demography in section 2, we could 
see that the populations of different countries were definitely not aging uniformly - not across 
the industrial countries and not even within the European Union. 
In many respects, these findings turn the maxim we often hear on its head and that is that 
globalisation is especially dangerous in times when the population is aging because it 
threatens our social systems. Increasing non-wage labor costs (here the rise in pay-as-you-go 
pension contributions in the first pension scheme scenario) in aging economies do indeed 
make life difficult because in younger economies companies can pay the same net wage yet 
the gross wages are lower. Conversely, a comparison of Figure 9 with Figure 10 shows that it 
is precisely because of this that a partial changeover to a funded pension system delivers 
advantages. It is only by using the international capital market that the demographic risk can 
be diversified. 
4.5  International capital flows 
The cushioning role of the international capital market is based on the capital flows prompted 
by the aging process. The effects on savings and returns related to demography, which were 
described in the two previous sections, have a different impact in the various countries. With 
free mobility of capital, therefore, flows of capital will come from the aging countries with 
low rates of returns and move into the young economies where returns tend to be high and this 
causes the returns to balance out. 
Figure 11 shows capital exports for five regions in the OECD (Germany, the rest of the EU, 
the USA, Japan and the rest of the OECD), measured as a percentage of the gross domestic 
product in each case. The model first reproduces the well-known initial levels of capital 
flows: Japan as a particularly large exporter of capital and the USA as the largest importer of 
capital. As is the case for Japan, Germany saves more than it invests in its own country but to 
nowhere near the same extent. 
These very different initial values now have to accommodate the demographic change. Falling 
support ratios mean lower savings, thus tending to reduce capital exports. This is particularly 
clear in Japan where capital exports are declining sharply. If Japan had not started with such a 
high export rate, Japan would become an importer of capital. Because aging in Germany is 
more pronounced than in the other EU states (see the change, not the level, in Figure 2), the 
change in the capital export rate is also greater than it is in the other EU states. In the USA 
and the remaining OECD countries, where the support ratio is initially rising again, they are 
reducing their capital imports; from 2030 onwards the other OECD countries will even 
become exporters of capital, primarily in the USA, where the high gross domestic product 
makes the capital import rate plotted in Figure 11 particularly important. 
Figure 11: Capital flows within the OECD 
 
Source: MEA-OLGA model (Börsch-Supan, Ludwig and Winter, 2003). 
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5.  The Development of Returns from Equities, Fixed-
interest Securities and Secure Investments 
 
In the previous section we demonstrated that the aging of the population brings about a 
relatively small yet significant fall in capital returns. There is, however, no reason to expect 
that this decrease in the rate of return will affect all types of capital investment to the same 
degree. In reality, it is probable that risk-free investments - such as money market investments 
- or relatively low-risk investments like government bonds will be more severely affected by 
the fall in rates of return as a result of aging than risky capital investments - such as equities 
or corporate bonds. This hypothesis is based on the consideration that older households tend 
to invest in risk-free capital investments because they do not want to jeopardize the income 
from capital required for their old age as a result of a sudden negative shock that affects the 
returns from risky investments. These considerations do not only appear in numerous 
investment recommendations and products, as summarized in section 5.1 but they also have a 
theoretical basis, as section 5.2 shows, in the fundamentals of portfolio selection of an 
individual household, which is important for our simulation model. 
As the population grows older, restructuring in the portfolios of many households increases 
the overall demand for risk-free investments on the financial markets. Where there is a given 
supply, the increased demand causes the prices of these investments to rise, thus putting 
pressure on returns. This effect is further reinforced because, in an aging economy, the overall 
supply of capital and thus also the supply of relatively risk-free securities falls.  
A quantitative forecast of these portfolio effects is, however, very difficult because it is 
almost impossible to estimate how the future portfolio selection pattern of households will 
develop. Our simulation model, which is described in more detail in section 5.3, should 
therefore be seen as illustrative. Many may find it surprising, but overall there are only very 
minor effects. Our model forecasts an increase in the risk premium for shares ("equity 
premium") by around 70 basis points in the coming 25 years and a corresponding greater 
decline in returns for investments without an interest and price risk. This and further 
simulation results are shown in section 5.4. 
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5.1  Typical strategic investment recommendations 
The two strategic recommendations for investments probably given most frequently, 
according to advice from typical financial service providers, are to rely mainly on equities 
during the early stages of working life and then to gradually change to safe forms of 
investment as one grows older. In addition, portfolio recommendations are common for 
different types of investors. Here it is usual to differentiate between "growth orientated", 
"balanced" and "conservative" investors. Typically, the proportion of equities is reduced in 
the sequence listed in favour of higher fixed-interest securities and cash deposits (see table 1). 
 
Table 1: Typical recommendations for “strategic portfolio allocation” 
Shares of portfolio 
Source and investor type 
Cash Bonds Equities
Ratio between bonds and 
equities 
Fidelity     
Conservative 50 30 20 1.5 
Moderate 20 40 40 1.0 
Aggressive 5 30 65 0.5 
Merrill Lynch     
Conservative 20 35 45 0.8 
Moderate 5 40 55 0.7 
Aggressive 5 20 75 0.3 
Jane Bryant Quinn     
Conservative 50 30 20 1.5 
Moderate 10 40 50 0.8 
Aggressive 0 0 100 0.0 
The New York Times     
Conservative 20 40 40 1.0 
Moderate 10 30 60 0.5 
Aggressive 0 20 80 0.3 
Source: Canner et al. (1997) "An Asset Allocation Puzzle", translated. 
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However, with this rough categorization it is unclear whether the different investor types are 
differentiating between their risk aversion, their investment time scale or the extent to which 
their income from work is at risk and on which expectations for returns the recommendations 
are based. Superimposed over the above mentioned recommendation on optimum portfolio 
allocation over the life cycle are classifications on the extent to which an investor will 
gradually change from being a growth-orientated investor to a conservative investor over the 
life cycle. For an example of this, see the "MLP matrix" (Heinrich, 2002). 
 
5.2  Theoretically based models of portfolio allocation of an individual household 
The optimum portfolio allocation over the lifecycle and the resulting restructuring of assets in 
an aging society are therefore complex. Tables such as the ones above are by no means 
adequate to produce a fairly reliable quantitative estimate. Before we come in section 5.3 to 
present our simulation model for supply and demand of households of different ages on the 
financial markets, we therefore require a theoretically reliable model of portfolio allocation 
from the view of an individual household based on the following fundamentals. 
The "Capital Asset Pricing Model" (CAPM) developed by Markovitz (1952) is the best 
known theoretically based model for portfolio allocation. Even today, is it a major component 
of any academic lecture on finance during university studies and, in spite of its shortcomings, 
it is still commonly used - unchanged - in practice. Besides the rules of thumb that are often 
used when providing investment advice, the CAPM is often still the only instrument for 
portfolio optimization. 
The problems of applying the CAPM uncritically are however clearly demonstrated by 
looking at the assumptions on which it is based but, if these assumptions are not correctly 
applied, the validity of the results cannot be guaranteed in any way. For instance, Markovitz 
assumes that the investor is only interested in the expected returns and the standard deviation 
of these and makes one single portfolio decision - in other words, with no dynamic 
adjustment. In the balanced view of the model, all investors place their money in the market 
portfolio which, depending on their risk profile, is mixed with an appropriate proportion of 
safe investments (cash, funds from the money market) and may even be financed with credit 
where this is consistent with the investor's attitude to risk. The fact that all investors - 
irrespective of their risk preference - should invest in the same optimum ratio of risky 
investments, is a familiar reference in the form of Tobin's "Mutual Fund Theorem" (1958). 
The assumption stating that both upward and downward swings have a negative effect on the 
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benefits to the investor and the statistical view of one-off investments are therefore 
particularly critical. 
We therefore apply a dynamic portfolio model. The distinctive features of these models, 
originally developed by Merton (1969, 1971, 1973) and Samuelson (1969) and which are 
essentially applied unchanged, are that in a life cycle model the portfolio is selected at the 
same time as consumption and savings decisions are being made. The savings decision is 
understood to mean both the amount saved and the investment of existing assets and the net 
new savings. Because they are integrated in a consumption or savings model, these models - if 
they are embedded in the overall economic environment - are also termed the "Consumption 
Capital Asset Pricing Model" (in brief: C-CAPM) (Lucas, 1978; Mehra and Prescott; 1985). 
These models nevertheless also make extremely limiting assumptions, which we explain 
below, so that it is clear to the reader that the quantitative results that then follow can only be 
considered to be rough estimates. We must however adopt some of these bold assumptions in 
order to be able to use the simulation model but, in important cases, we can relax the bold 
assumptions of the C-CAPM model considerably. 
(a) Risk preferences of households 
A comparatively unproblematic assumption relates to the risk preferences of households. The 
C-CAPM model assumes that, irrespective of their assets, investors always prefer the same 
proportion of risky investments. Campbell (2002) explains why this assumption, in spite of 
many justified doubts that are raised at first sight, is entirely realistic because - in spite of 
considerable increases in income and assets over the last few decades - households are only 
very gradually placing an increased proportion of their assets in risky investments. 
Consequently, we are not making any changes to this characteristic in our model.  
(b) Returns that are constant over time 
The original C-CAPM model adopts the premise that each individual household estimates that 
expected future returns (and the distribution of these) are constant over time. This assumption 
poses a problem, particularly because we specifically want to model changes. 
Our model extends the C-CAPM model so that the average returns expected by households 
changes from age group to age group and can, for instance, adapt to the demographic shift. 
The households adopt a (deterministic) trend in respect of returns and factor this into their 
long-term planning. 
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(c) Income from employment that is safe and known 
The C-CAPM model abstains from the fact that employment can be viewed as an additional 
investment, which brings in earnings that are more or less secure and thus can be viewed 
within the context of asset risks. The cash value of future income from work can be viewed as 
an asset and, for this reason, the term "human capital" has become established with 
economists. This human capital is generally not tradable and so only implicitly represents a 
capital investment in the usual sense of the term. Apart from the self-employed sector, this is 
more likely to be a low-risk rather than a risky investment. Consequently, each employee 
implicitly holds a non-tradable, low-risk investment. For the younger age group, in particular, 
this investment may exceed the optimum proportion of low-risk investments out of total 
assets. The household will then invest the largest possible proportion of its free assets in risky 
investments. Over the life cycle, the significance of non-tradable human capital as part of total 
assets nevertheless falls because the period of working life that lies ahead becomes shorter 
and equally savings in money and real-estate assets rise. Thus the optimum proportion of 
risky assets falls over the life cycle, even if the attitude of the investor to risk does not change. 
The conventional C-CAPM model ignores this effect. 
Campbell and Viceira (2002) describe in detail the differences that apply to optimum portfolio 
allocation, both with and without consideration to this and similar effects. Their results are 
complex and depend on many parameters, for instance how sudden changes in income 
correlate with returns on the equities market. In the event of positive correlation - as is 
typically the case for self-employed entrepreneurs but also if employees hold shares in their 
company or profit-sharing plans - the attractiveness of risky investments diminishes. In 
contrast, investments with negative correlation act as a safeguard against sudden changes in 
income. As a general rule, it can be ascertained that the assumptions on the level of risk 
involved in income from employment and its correlation to returns on the capital market only 
bring about negligible differences in optimum portfolio allocation. In contrast, the principle of 
taking income from employment into account has far-reaching implications. For modelling on 
the portfolio decision we have therefore added remuneration from employment to the C-
CAPM model. We have therefore decided not to model this income from employment as 
being risky and endogenous (i.e. the amount can be controlled by the employee, as desired), 
as Bodie, Merton and Samuelson (1992) have done. 
(d) Rationing of credit 
A further and final aspect relates to realistic limitations of portfolio allocation. If there were 
no limitations, the optimum situation would be for young investors to sell no-risk investments 
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short, i.e. to take out loans for risky investments and ones with correspondingly higher 
returns.  Viewed realistically, short-selling of risk-free investments is only a possibility for a 
small number of investors. Buying equities on credit may have become increasingly popular 
during the stock market boom of the late 1990s but, typically, such a course of action is only 
adopted by very few people. Banks, too, will only permit such transactions if they are backed 
by considerable wealth or a regular high income.  When modelling portfolios, it is usual to 
limit short-selling of no-risk investments and this convention has indeed been incorporated 
into our model. 
 
5.3  The MEA-PORTA simulation model for portfolio selection 
Taking as a basis this portfolio decision of a single household, we are now developing the 
"MEA-PORTA" simulation model, which brings together households of different ages and 
different cohort groups in financial markets in order to map the differential effects of an aging 
population on returns for risky and risk-free securities.9 Because financial markets are 
becoming ever closer, we are not limiting ourselves to Germany but instead we are modelling 
development for the whole European Union. The demographic development, the overall 
underlying economic conditions and the basic values for the portfolio therefore correspond to 
the average for the 15 EU countries. 
We are modelling the trends in returns and volumes for three investment categories: 
• Risk-free investments ("cash") 
• Low-risk investments ("fixed-interest securities") 
• Risky investments ("equities") 
By risk-free investments we mean investments not subject to any interest or price risks, in 
other words cash, i.e. primarily savings deposits and related investment vehicles. We interpret 
risky investments as all investments in productive capital, as defined in the MEA-OLGA 
model, i.e. equities, industrial bonds and direct placements in corporations outside the 
financial sector. In between there are low-risk investments, in particular fixed-interest 
securities issued by regional and local authorities. 
As far as we know, there is no model that analyses the portfolio decision of numerous 
households and their interaction on the capital market in the course of a demographic shift. 
One exception is Brooks (2003), who simulates these interactions using a small but 
 
9 A detail description of the model and a discussion can be found in Ludwig (2003). 
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consequently very stylized model that incorporates a rough map of the demography. A 
problem of such small and stylized models is that they distort the effects of the capital 
markets and their scope delivers an exaggerated result. 
In order to avoid this distortion and to produce the most realistic forecasts possible, we are 
adopting the same population structure of overlapping generations, as described for the MEA-
OLGA model in section 4. From this model we are also adopting the supply side of financial 
markets - in particular, the securities of issuing companies -, the calculation of overall 
economic balances on the labor and goods markets, and the market for productive capital. 
Thus at the outset our simulation model is a suitably realistic description of demographic 
change and trends within the economy as a whole. 
In addition, we model the limitations in household behavior, which has been explained in the 
previous section. Whereas we have kept very close to reality in respect of demographics, we 
have simplified savings and portfolio decisions so that we can represent this complex process 
whilst keeping the outlay within acceptable limits. This means that we simplify households' 
investment decisions considerably - as is usual in the references mentioned in the previous 
section - by assuming that the households can only chose between two alternatives - a risk-
free ("cash") and a more risky capital investment ("equities"). We cover the third form of 
investment - low-risk fixed-interest securities - through a weighted average of these two 
investments, with the weighting determined in such a way that the returns are the historical 
yield to maturity of fixed-interest securities. For this reason, we assume that the overall 
economic growth model (essentially identical to the MEA-OLGA model) provides us with the 
returns of risky investments (equities, etc. in productive capital), the characteristic and level 
of which we can take as a given in the portfolio model.  
The basic structure of portfolio models such as the MEA-PORTA model and the model 
already mentioned from Brooks (2003) is based on the work of the Nobel Prize winner Lucas 
(1978). They are characterized by the assumption that the supply of and demand for risk-free 
securities on the part of the model households actually occurs and that the risk-free interest 
rate adjusts so that supply and demand on this market balance out. As mentioned in section 3, 
realistic models must solve what is termed the "Equity premium puzzle", which was first 
raised as a subject for discussion by Mehra and Prescott (1985). This is the phenomenon that 
conventional economic models underestimate the risk premium obtained on the market for 
risky investments.  We follow the model of Constantidines, Donaldson and Mehra (2002), 
whose work was described briefly in the previous section, and adopt credit limitations that are 
the same as those that apply to realistic mapping of actual household behavior. More 
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precisely, we assume that credit for model households is so strictly rationed that the maximum 
amount of credit is only a certain proportion of the available period income. 
Furthermore, we assume an exogenous supply of risk-free securities. We adapt to this 
exogenous supply in such a way that the risk premium mapped by the model is within a 
realistic order of magnitude ("calibration"). The MEA-PORTA model therefore supplies more 
realistic forecasts of the "equity premium" than older models presented in the academic 
literature. 
We adopt the parameters of the MEA-OLGA model to calibrate the MEA-PORTA model. In 
addition, we require the initial values for returns of the three forms of investment, their 
distribution over time and their proportions in the household portfolio. As we have no EU-
wide average data on the return from productive capital, for the following analysis we are 
calibrating the part of the macroeconomic model in a way that the return from the risky 
investment in the initial year of 2000 is 7.6% and the return from the low-risk investment is 
4.1% which reflects the performance of the DAX and REXX indices for stocks and fixed-
interest securities in Germany. The proportions of the three investments in the portfolio are 
taken from Guiso et al. (2003) who have recorded the composition of household portfolios in 
the major European countries (cf. Table 2). We form the "EU" portfolio approximately by 
taking the average for the four major EU countries. 
 
Table 2: Proportions of investments in the portfolios of European households 
 France Germany Italy UK "EU" 
Cash 32.6 37.6 22.7 21.5 28.6 
Bonds 17.2 34.8 32.3 26.5 27.7 
Equities 50.4 27.6 45.0 52.0 43.8 
Source: Guiso, Haliassos and Jappelli (2003) and own calculations. Indirect investments (pension funds, life 
insurances, etc.) have been apportioned pro rata to the original investment types. The values refer to the period 
from 1996 to 1999. 
 
We are finally setting the exogenous supply of risk-free investments in such a way that the 
portfolio proportions correspond to the last column of Table 2 and the return from a risk-free 
investment in the initial year of 2000 is set at 3.3%. 
All these calibration assumptions must be seen as estimates and the results presented in the 
next section are therefore to be understood as indications. It is obviously impossible to 
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estimate precisely (down to the last tenth of a decimal place) how returns will move over the 
next 40 years. 
5.4  Simulation results of the MEA-PORTA model 
We are initially forecasting the development using the assumptions on population and 
employed persons, which were also the basis for section 4, i.e. the average trend as was 
presented in Figures 4 and 5. As can be seen in Figure 12, the risk-free return, in other words 
return on cash investments with no risk relating to price or interest, will fall relatively sharply 
over the next 25 years from 3.3% to just over 1.8% in 2027. This decline is much more 
pronounced than the fall in returns from risky investments (equities) from approx. 7.6% to 
6.8% by the year 2027. After this year, when the aging of the population in Germany reaches 
its peak, the return on safe investments will then rise again, whereas the returns from the 
equity market will essentially move sideways and will only begin to rise again after 2035, the 
year when the aging of the population in continental Europe reaches its peak. We calculate 
that, in the period up to 2025, the risk premium that the market will pay for a risky investment 
- the "equity premium" - will rise by approximately 70 basis points. However, this effect is 
temporary. It will fall again to the extent that the baby-boom generation will use cash assets 
invested for old-age provision for consumption purposes. 
 
Figure 12: Returns from cash and equities, and the risk premium in the basic scenario 
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Source: MEA-PORTA model. 
 
Figure 13 adds the movements of yields to maturity of fixed-interest securities, i.e. the low-
risk investment which was modelled as a composite capital market instrument of risky and 
risk-free investment. The return on bonds falls correspondingly slightly less than is the case 
for pure cash deposits but, with a decline from 4.1% in the initial year to 2.8% in 2027, the 
drop is much more pronounced that the fall in returns from equities. 
The proportions for the portfolios change surprisingly little, as can be seen in Figure 14. The 
proportion of relatively safe investments held on average by EU households will increase by 
around five percentage points between 2000 and 2027 from 25% to 30%, whereas the 
proportion of shares will fall by around 10 percentage points from approximately 48% to 
about. 38%. After the aging process reaches its peak, the proportion of equities held in the 
portfolios of EU households will again increase: the change in the structure of portfolios is 
therefore only a transitional effect of the baby-boom generation. 
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Figure 13: Returns on an individual investment and the total portfolio 
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Source: MEA-PORTA model. 
 
 
Figure 14: The average portfolio in the wake of demographic change 
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Source: MEA-PORTA model. 
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How robust are these forecasts? How do they depend on the assumptions for trends in the 
population and employment? Can a high growth rate for the economy as a whole cushion the 
fall in returns? In order to answer this question, we compared the basic forecast in Figure 12 
with each of the two extreme scenarios, which probably mark the limits of possible 
movements. 
Various scenarios for modelling employment in Germany are presented in Figure 15. These 
are the most likely scenario ("Scenario E2"), which follows the basic forecast, and also the 
extreme E1 and E3 scenarios, which have already been presented in section 2 (cf. Figure 5). 
 
Figure 15: How does the forecast trend in returns change if the development of 
employment is more positive/negative than in the basic scenario? 
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Source: MEA-PORTA model. 
 
In the pessimistic E1 scenario, we assume that current employment rates also apply in the 
future, whereas the E3 scenario represents a very optimistic trend in which the rate of 
employment for women almost converges with the rate for men, the retirement age increases 
from 60 to 65 and the unemployment rate falls to 4%. The substantial aging in the pessimistic 
E1 scenario causes the risk premium to rise much more steeply. According to our calculation, 
in such a situation it would rise by around 0.8 percentage points. The impact on equities and 
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cash will also be greater. Conversely, a very positive development in employment would 
reduce the fluctuations in returns considerably. 
 
Figure 16: How does the forecast trend in returns change if the growth rate in the economy 
as a whole is higher/lower than in the basic scenario? 
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Source: MEA-PORTA model. 
 
The fluctuations are somewhat greater if the growth rates in EU countries vary. In view of the 
current economic situation, a real growth rate of 1.5% per year looks rather optimistic. For 
this reason, we varied the growth rate so that we could, in particular, analyse a situation with a 
low growth rate (1.0% p.a.) but also look at a high growth rate (2.0% p.a.). As Figure 16 
shows, a low growth rate produces a result that is similar to greater aging because the high 
demand by an aging population for risk-free investments at a time of low growth in incomes 
conflicts with a low supply of such investments. The important result that can be deduced is 
that a higher growth rate can actually compensate - at least in part - for the impact that aging 
has on the capital market. 
Overall, the rise in the "equity premium" and thus the steep decline in returns from secure 
cash deposits compared to the comparatively stable returns on equities is a robust result. The 
key reason for this development is that older households tend to invest in risk-free capital 
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investments because they do not want to jeopardize the income from capital required for their 
old age as a result of a sudden negative shock that affects the returns from risky investments. 
This restructuring of the portfolios of many households increases the demand for risk-free 
investments. Where there is a given supply, the increased demand causes the prices of these 
investments to rise, thus putting pressure on returns. This effect is further reinforced because, 
in an aging economy, the overall supply of capital and thus also the supply of relatively risk-
free forms of investment falls. 
 58
 
6. Returns and Assets on the Residential Property Market 
 
For various reasons, a separate section has been devoted to the market for residential property. 
Firstly, residential property accounts for a major part of privately held assets and accordingly 
provides an important motive for saving; the movement in the value of owner-occupied 
homes or properties that are rented out is an extremely important factor in determining the 
situation of a household with regard to assets and/or income. At the same time and in contrast 
to other financial investments, property is a halfway house: for owner-occupiers of apartments 
and houses the home is not just an asset that is "parked" - it is also a consumer good that can 
be actively enjoyed by living in it. Consequently, it cannot be classed as "productive capital", 
which was the main emphasis of sections 4 and 5, and for which the substitution effect - 
machines and computers replace the work of people - was so important in view of the scarcity 
of labor in an aging society. The substitution effect does not apply to residential property. 
Ultimately, the residential property market is influenced by the demographic shift both 
directly and indirectly, because an aging society needs different housing from a young 
society. This is particularly true if one views it from the perspective that a population that is 
shrinking in the long term will need fewer homes than a society where the population remains 
stable or is growing. In contrast to financial assets, involvement in capital markets does not 
provide any relief for real estate assets in the face of dwindling demand. 
Our procedure for assessing the plausibility of an asset meltdown of this kind of capital is 
fundamentally different from that for the forms of investment discussed previously, as the 
scope for "dividing" residential property is limited (most households generally only buy one 
house and it is very unusual to buy a fraction of one or several houses, unless it is in the form 
of a property fund) and the dual role as both a capital investment and consumer goods 
transcends the bounds of existing portfolio models. We therefore adopt an empirical 
approach: We first analyse the pattern of residential property consumption over the life cycle 
and the trends over the last two decades. We then project a typical residential property 
consumption curve over the life cycle, taking into account the cohort effects of residential 
property consumption, which also include the expected trends in income, and project this 
taking the demographic changes into account. 
It is not surprising that our results show that there will not be a boom in the property market 
over the next few decades. However, at the same time, a dramatic fall in prices due to 
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demographic factors as, for instance, predicted by Mankiw and Weil (1989) for the USA, has 
become unrealistic. We argue this case in section 3. Our less pessimistic estimate is based on 
the development of residential property consumption over the life cycle, which implies lower 
household sizes and the clear trend over the last 20 years towards occupying a more space - a 
pattern that we have observed for all age groups. 
Quantitative forecasts for returns depend on the region and sector and therefore cannot be 
covered by this study. This part of the study provides evidence from Germany which is 
suggestive for France (probably more dampened) and Italy (probably somewhat stronger) as 
well. The main insight is that household size lags population size by about 20 years. One 
reason is that an older society features a smaller household size and thus, ceteris paribus, more 
households. Hence, housing demand will only begin to fall from 2025 onwards even if 
populations start declining today. Thereafter housing demand will only drop very gradually 
such that house prices will not fall dramatically over the next 30 years. Mankiw and Weil’s 
(1989) estimate of a housing price drop between 1990 and 2010 to half of their original levels 
will certainly not materialize. 
 
6.1  Trends in the demand for residential property 
Many studies on prospects for the German residential market have analysed the consumption 
of living space over the life cycle on the basis of cross-sectional data from the German 
Income and Expenditure Surveys (EVS) or the Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP). The same 
procedure characterizes the analysis by Mankiw and Weil (1989). Figure 17 shows the 
average area of residential accommodation consumed per household in Germany. A 
comparison of age profiles in the east and west show that they are similar - it is only the level 
that is very different. 
 
Figure 17: Average living area per household according to age, west-east comparison  
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Source: Socioeconomic panel (SOEP), average for the years 1999-2001 
 
One could conclude from Figure 17 that the consumption of living space will fall drastically 
in view of an aging population, because older households require considerably less living 
space than younger ones and in the future there will much fewer younger households. 
However, it would be wrong to draw such a conclusion. This is because the profiles in Figure 
20 hide many developments that need to be separated from each other. Firstly, the majority of 
households that Figure 17 show as being older than 60 years old, were purchased or initially 
rented at a different time than was the case for the younger households. Part of the supposed 
age-related trend in the figure is actually a development over time - a "cohort effect", as we 
have described in detail in section 3.3. In section 6.3 we will therefore separate the age-related 
and cohort effects before we can start to make a projection with respect to the demographic 
shift. 
Börsch-Supan (1993) explains in detail which demographic mechanisms play a role. Firstly, 
the falling demand resulting from the declining population must be mentioned - see the left-
hand part of Figure 18.  
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Figure 18: Trends in population and households 
                       Population                         Households 
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At the same time, the average size of households in an aging society becomes smaller so the 
number of households falls much more slowly than the population - see the right-hand part of 
Figure 18. This effect cannot be stressed enough: Whereas according to UN forecasts the 
population of Germany will fall from approximately 2005 onwards, the number of households 
will not start to decline until 2020, in other words with a time delay of 15 years. The number 
of households will not drop below today’s figures before 2043 and the figure will be just 
under 3% lower than today in the year 2050.  
The scale effects of the area required for a household also need to be taken into account. In 
other words, smaller households characteristically have a higher floor area per person. 
Demand for residential space will therefore fall much less substantially than might be feared 
on the basis of the population developments. 
What is more, rising life expectancy will also induce higher demand for living space. Medical 
progress is improving the health of people of pensionable age and will enable more 
pensioners to live independently within their own four walls for longer. Börsch-Supan (1993) 
quantifies the effect of increasing life expectancy at approx. 20% of new building units10. 
                                                 
10 Average of new building units from 1975 to 1990. 
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Demographic factors – a changed age structure and shrinking birth cohorts – are accompanied 
by economic changes. The young birth cohorts entering the housing market are typically more 
prosperous than the current generation of pensioners. An income and asset effect involving 
higher housing consumption, despite unchanged household size, has been seen in the past too 
and is very likely to continue in the future. Even if incomes and assets are likely to grow more 
slowly in the future than in previous decades, housing demand will increase simply because 
those from the richer post-war generations make up a larger proportion of the overall 
population. Finally, a third trend, which can be viewed as a "cohort effect" (see the next 
section) and may increase demand, is the move way from multi-generation homes to 
households occupied by single people, linked to the desire of pensioners to remain 
independent for as long as possible.  
 
6.2  Correct age profiles for residential property demand 
Below we are quantifying the trends described in the previous section concerning the change 
that manifests itself in the cohort-specific demand for housing. To do this, in the age profile of 
Figure 17, which was produced from cross-sectional data, we isolated the age-related effects 
(how the demand for housing changes when an age group becomes older) and cohort effects 
(how does the demand for housing change from cohort to cohort). We used the process 
devised by Deaton and Paxson (1994) to do this. 
The corrected age profile (see Figure 19) shows an almost constant demand for residential 
space from the age of approximately 45 onwards, which reflects the fact that only very few 
people move into a small dwelling in old age. In contrast, the cohort effects (see Figure 20) 
illustrate how the demand for housing continually increases with each age group. 
 
Figure 19: Corrected age effects in the demand for housing 
Age effects
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
25 29 33 37 41 45 49 53 57 61 65 69 73 77 81 85 89
Age effects
 
Source: Own calculations based on SOEP, 1984-2001. 
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Figure 20: Cohort effects in demand for housing 
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Source: Own calculations based on SOEP, 1984-2001. 
 
6.3  Three scenarios on the development of housing demand in the first half of the 21st 
century 
In a similar procedure to the one adopted in section 2, we used three scenarios for forecasting 
housing demand. These range from the very pessimistic to the optimistic and are therefore 
bound to cover future trends reliably.  
In the pessimistic W1 scenario, we assume that the demand for residential accommodation 
among future generations will only be at the same level as today's youngest generation.  The 
demand for housing is therefore developing in accordance with the age-specific demand for 
housing and the decline in the population. There will either be absolutely no increases in 
income or these will not be reflected in the demand for more residential space. At the same 
time, the demand in the federal states in the eastern part of Germany is maintained at today's 
level: there is no further convergence with the situation in the former West Germany. We 
therefore consider this scenario to be unrealistic. We will, however, show that even using 
these pessimistic assumptions, a dramatic fall in residential property prices in the order of 
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magnitude predicted by Mankiw and Weil (1989), who - as we know - forecast a 50 percent 
drop in prices and started off the "asset meltdown" debate, cannot occur. 
For the middle W2 scenario we assumed that the demand for housing of future eastern 
German birth cohorts will converge with the western German level by 2050. However, at the 
same time we assumed that the demand for housing was saturated at the 1990 level in the 
western part of Germany. The future cohort-related growth in demand is therefore purely 
derived from the need for the lower demand that currently exists in the east to catch up with 
the level in the west. When it comes to the future development of assets in the residential 
property sector, our middle scenario definitely errs on the side of caution. 
The optimistic W3 scenario projects the growth in the years prior to German Reunification. 
Equally, we also assume that east German demand will latch onto this growth trend. We 
consider this third scenario to be the "best case".  
In this context, our expectations are between scenarios W2 and W3. We are expecting both 
further convergence in the living standards between the west and the east and thus a 
convergence in demand for housing. At the same time, however, it must be expected that the 
historical growth rates will slow down, in the same way as the growth rates of per capita 
income have already weakened over the last few decades. 
 
6.4  Trends in the demand for housing in the face of demographic change 
By their definition the three scenarios exhibit a largely uniform trend until 2025 - see Figure 
21. Until 2025 demand for residential space will increase by around 10% in comparison to 
2002. This gives an annual mean rate of growth of approximately 0.45%, although the rate of 
increase will begin to slow down even before 2010. 
The forecasts begin to diverge sharply from 2025 onwards, because this is when the different 
assumptions on the future development of the cohort effects begin to have an impact. Whereas 
for the W1 scenario in which we assumed no further increase in demand for future birth 
cohorts, we calculated that by 2050 there would be a downturn in the demand for residential 
accommodation of approximately 15% as compared to 2025, for the W3 scenario we are 
forecasting a further, albeit minimal, increase in demand for housing in the second quarter of 
our century.  
Both forecasts are extreme - the one because it assumes no further growth for the next 50 
years and is even ruling out any effects as a result of eastern Germany catching up and the 
other because it assumes unbridled growth in demand for housing, even though growth in 
income over recent years has already slowed down. From today's perspective, the actual 
trends will probably lie between scenarios W2 and W3. Hence, whereas the demand for 
residential space between 2025 and 2050 will fall slightly between 2025 and 2050 for 
demographic reasons, a sharp fall to below today's level is rather unlikely. If one assumes that 
demand between 2025 and 2050 will fall by 5%, the decline each year will be around 0.2%. 
Figure 21: Development of demand for housing, indexed (2002=100) 
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Source: Own calculations on the basis of SOEP, 1984-2001, and the UN's population forecast (2000). 
 
The development of demand for housing forecast in Figure 21 therefore implies a much more 
stable development of property values on average than would be associated with an "asset 
meltdown" situation. In view of the declining population, substantial increases in value after 
2025 cannot be expected but in no way will values fall 47% by 2020, as feared by Mankiw 
and Weil. 
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7. Summary and Outlook 
 
According to our results, a catastrophic "asset meltdown" is extremely unlikely. The key 
reason behind this is that aging societies need more productive capital to take the place of 
labor, which is scarce, so the demand for capital is increasing. A further explanation, which - 
in comparison - is of secondary importance, is the internationalization of capital markets, 
which allows finance to be provided for those production facilities abroad in “younger” 
countries (notably the United States, to some extent also the United Kingdom and France) 
from which, in future, consumer goods will be imported to the “older” countries (the most 
prominent being Germany, Italy and Japan). Internationalization of capital markets almost 
completely prevents a decline in capital returns prompted by pension reform. 
The spectre of an "asset meltdown" is ultimately based on incorrect order of magnitudes and 
time dimensions. In fact, the aging process occurs slowly and can be predicted and the 
establishment of the next generation is superimposed over the departure of the baby-boom 
generation. So it is ultimately no surprise that changes in households' portfolios are small on 
average and there will be no great distortions between safe and risky investments. 
The majority of these arguments do not apply to the residential property market. Aging of the 
population is less of a threat than the fact that population numbers are declining. However, 
there will be a time lag of 15 to 20 years before the number of households starts to fall, which 
means that the figure will increase until around 2025, although the population is already in 
decline. Factors relating to income and assets will also play a role so a dramatic slump in 
demand for housing and with it a drastic fall in the value of residential property is not 
expected before 2040. 
In spite of this, economic policymakers still cannot afford to relax. Even if capital markets are 
not threatened by an "asset meltdown", the development of employment looks much less rosy. 
The effect of the demographic change is that the number of gainfully employed persons will 
fall sharply from 2010 onwards, whereas the number of consumers will largely remain 
constant until around 2040. This will put pressure on production capability and thus also on 
the overall growth of our economy: labor - at least in the highly skilled sector - will become 
increasingly scarce because it is not possible to compensate for this decline in employment 
per head of population by intensifying the capital deployed. For this, the change is too rapid 
and too extensive. Labor productivity will in fact need to increase in order to compensate for 
the effects of the shift in the age structure on domestic production. Owing to the effects of 
 68
population aging in particular, education and training will assume an increasingly important 
role. 
The greatest threat will naturally be to the pay-as-you-go social insurance systems. The amply 
discussed age-related rise in the burden of contributions and tax resulting from pension, health 
and long-term care insurance schemes and other benefits financed by tax for older citizens 
have dramatic impacts on the future employment market. The ever widening gap between 
gross and disposable earnings - the burden of taxation and the non-wage labor costs - 
threatens to reduce the work available to the younger generation at the very time when we 
need it the most. 
This study also shows that the capital market plays a particularly important role in an aging 
society. The logic of this is obvious because labor is becoming scarce. There are however two 
further reasons. Firstly, capital investments are the only way of distributing resources over 
time and between the generations. More specifically, in the case of the demographic shift, 
capital investments are the vehicle that allow part of the earning power of baby-boomers to be 
used to finance their own pension instead of allowing the entire pension to be financed by 
those of the next generation, who will be completely overwhelmed because of their greatly 
reduced numbers. We therefore need the capital market so that the earning power of the 
younger generation is not overwhelmed by the excessive demands of the older generation. 
The second reason lies in the international mobility of capital. As we know, mobility of the 
factor labor is not particularly good and we old countries cannot expect that younger countries 
will help to finance their pay-as-you-go systems, nor is it likely that a surge of migrants will 
pay their pension contributions. Capital, in contrast, can move around the global economy and 
bring in earnings from countries abroad where labor is more plentiful than it is here. For “old 
countries” such as Germany, Italy and Japan in particular, an open and globalised world can 
be of assistance during the aging process. Rich in consumers, poor in labor, these countries 
must have an intrinsic interest in boosting their imports. Free trading relations are therefore a 
substitute for inward migration. However, capital is required to extend production abroad. Not 
only that, it will also certainly be in the old countries’ interest to retain a certain degree of 
control over companies which will be producing our consumer goods in the future by means 
of the mechanism offered by their foreign direct investments. 
This exchange is not a one-way process. It offers scope for improvement that allows both 
benefits for the aging countries, which are relatively short of labor, as well as for the 
economies with younger populations that are relatively short of capital. The advantages for 
the old countries lie in a restored balance between employment and the demand for goods. 
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The younger countries obtain both capital and sales markets. The demographically younger 
countries will thus be able to grow faster than they would do without direct investments from 
and exports to the old countries. 
We can therefore safely put the asset meltdown scare to rest, and proceed to exploit the 
multifaceted advantages that global capital markets can offer for our aging world. 
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